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This thesis is an analysis of the methods used by top-
level Marine Corps financial management to measure the
effectiveness of the active duty military pay system.
Specific characteristics of measurement quality, usefulness,
and motivational capability are discussed. Current measures
used to monitor effectiveness are described, including those
of the Marine Corps Disbursing On-Site Examination Teams and
the Disbursing Performance Standards Program. These measures
are then analyzed in relation to the specific measurement
characteristics. The thesis concludes that the current
measurement process does not appear to provide adequate
information to monitor pay system effectiveness appropriate-
ly. Recommendations to improve the measurement system
include reporting more information on the accuracy and
timeliness of the pay system as a whole (as opposed to that
of individual commands)
,
placing more emphasis on measuring
and reporting pay-related administrative performance, and
reporting more information relevant to the effectiveness of
the automated portion of the system (the computer)
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. BACKGROUND
The Marine Corps active duty military pay system began
operating in 1973. A General Accounting Office audit report
in 1980 stated that a significant weakness of the system was
management's failure to establish adequate effectiveness
measurement procedures: "a means to adequately measure system
effectiveness has never been established, and management has
lacked information showing the action needed to correct many
system problems" [Ref. 1],
Many improvements have been made to the pay system since
1980, but the overall system is still deficient in satisfying
user information needs [Ref. 2]. The lack of an adequate
effectiveness measurement system contributes to this defi-
ciency. Senior financial management officials at Head-
quarters, U.S. Marine Corps (HQMC) in Washington, D.C. and at
the Marine Corps Finance Center (MCFC) in Kansas City,
Missouri use various methods and reports to gauge the
effectiveness of the system; taken together, these may or may
not provide sufficient information to assess the overall
quality and effectiveness of the function of paying Marines.
An evaluation of these procedures could help justify the
adequacy of the current measurement system or point the way
to improve the system so that management can adequately
monitor pay system performance.
B. OBJECTIVE
Effectiveness has been defined as "the extent to which
actual output corresponds to the organization's goals and
objectives" [Ref. 3, pg. 467], In other words, effectiveness
means the ability to accomplish a goal. It is not the same
as efficiency, which is "the ability to produce a desired
effect with the least effort or waste" [Ref. 4]. To il-
lustrate the difference, a system can be efficient if all
segments of the system do what they are designed to do using
the least amount of resources — what it does, it does well.
But to be effective, the system must be designed to do the
tasks necessary to achieve its goals — to do the "right"
things. The system can be 100% efficient in what it is
doing, but it is not effective unless its goals are being
met.
The objective of this thesis is to evaluate the methods
used by top-level Marine Corps financial management to
measure the effectiveness of the active duty military pay
system. Measuring effectiveness involves determining the
extent to v/hich the system meets its goals. Although the pay
system has many objectives, the major goals of concern to the
senior financial manager in the Marine Corps are accuracy and
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timeliness [Ref. 5]. These two goals are in keeping with the
official purpose of the Marine Corps disbursing system: to
"provide prompt, convenient, and accurate disbursing ser-
vice..." [Ref. 6]. This thesis, then, will focus on the
methods being used to determine if the pay system provides
accurate and timely payments.
C. THE MARINE CORPS MILITARY PAY SYSTEM
The Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps (FDMC) manages
the function of paying military personnel in the Marine
Corps. The FDMC is responsible for issuing policies and
procedures governing the military pay system and is assisted
(1) in policy matters by his staff in the Fiscal Division
(FD) at HQMC and (2) in procedural matters by the MCFC. The
pay system itself comprises not only the automated computer
system (the Joint Uniform Military Pay System/Manpower
Management System, or JUMPS/MMS) but also the people operat-
ing the system and the procedures they use. The accuracy and
timeliness of payments depends on the effectiveness of these
three parts of the overall pay system.
1. People
The people who design, operate, audit, and manage the
overall pay system are members of a vast network of organiza-
tions throughout the Marine Corps. Policy guidance is
provided by the FDMC and FD. Procedural instructions and
management of JUMPS/MMS are provided by the MCFC. Pay
11
related information is reported into the system by 23
disbursing offices (DOs) and by over 1200 administrative
offices at Marine Corps installations all over the world.
The 23 DOs pay 200,000 Marines twice a month based on the
data in the pay system. They rely on the accuracy of the
system and the effectiveness of its internal controls to
ensure the payments they make are proper.
Much is done to provide reasonable assurance that the
payment data provided by the system are accurate. Informa-
tion is manually audited before a pay entitlement or an event
leading to an entitlement is reported into the system.
JUMPS/MMS produces reports listing inconsistent conditions in
pay accounts; these conditions indicate mistakes in the
information which has been input. These reports must be
reviewed and corrective action taken. Marine Corps Disburs-
ing On-Site Examination Teams (MCDOSET) , MCFC, and local
administrative assistance teams and DO quality assurance
sections perform periodic audits of pay and personnel
records. These audits provide reasonable assurance that
payment data are accurate or identify error trends so they
can be corrected.
2. Procedures
Many regulations and procedural manuals govern the
operation of the pay system. Laws and Department of Defense
(DOD) regulations authorize military pay entitlements and the
conditions under which they may be paid. Various Marine
12
Corps directives prescribe policies and procedures for
administering these entitlements and for operating JUMPS/MMS.
Individual commands issue local instructions. Taken as a
whole, these regulations and procedures publish all the
requirements for paying Marines and constitute an integral
part of the overall military pay system.
Procedures must be properly followed to provide
accurate and timely payments. Formal schools teach pay
entitlements and procedural requirements. DO quality
assurance sections and local administrative assistance teams
review and report to commanding and disbursing officers the
effectiveness of office procedures and provide refresher
training to disbursing and administrative personnel. One
function of MCDOSET during their examination of each DO and
administrative office is to review internal control measures
and operating procedures and recommend ways to increase their
effectiveness. This review provides reasonable assurance
that the procedures used comply with applicable Marine Corps
directives, or it identifies problem areas which need to be
strengthened.
3. JUMPS/MMS
This automated computer system contains both pay and
manpower management information. The pay system "part" of
JUMPS/MMS is managed by the MCFC. Pay-related information is
electronically transmitted from administrative and disbursing
offices to the main computer in Kansas City, where it is
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processed to compute pay entitlements, allowances, withhold-
ing taxes, and other items necessary to determine how much is
due on payday. Specific payment amounts are then transmitted
to DOs or directly to a Marine's financial institution in
time for designated paydays. Although subsidiary personal
financial records (PFRs) are maintained by field DOs, over
99% of regular payday payments are based solely on the
official automated record.
JUMPS/MMS is continually being updated to improve
efficiency and to comply with changes in laws and regulations
governing military pay. Although system modifications are
tested before implementation, mistakes in design and program-
ming occur because of the complexities of the computer
programs and time constraints dictated by regulatory and
legislative deadlines. Marine Corps policy makes DOs
responsible for identifying system deficiencies [Ref. 7].
DOs audit a 5% random sample of PFRs each month to determine
if the computer is functioning properly. Design and program-
ming errors can thereby be identified, reported to the MCFC,
and corrected. MCFC provides each DO and administrative unit
with listings of all known computer system deficiencies and
instructions to overcome them until they can be corrected.
D. THE RESEARCH QUESTION
The primary question this thesis attempts to answer is
"Do current measurement techniques provide top-level Marine
14
Corps financial management officials with sufficient informa-
tion to adequately monitor pay system effectiveness?"
Several subsidiary questions must also be answered:
1. What considerations are relevant in selecting
measurements to be used to determine effectiveness?
2. What are the pay system goals, and how does the
Marine Corps define "effectiveness" in relation to
these goals?
3. How is the effectiveness of the pay system currently
being measured?
4. What are the deficiencies, if any, in the current
effectiveness measurement system?
5. What recommendations can be made to correct the
deficiencies and improve the system?
E. SCOPE
The main thrust of this thesis is an evaluation of the
methods used by the FDMC and his staff in FD to monitor
overall pay system effectiveness. It includes information
generated by the MCFC and MCDOSET. The thesis is an evalua-
tion of effectiveness measurement , not of effectiveness
itself. No attempt has been made to determine whether or not
the pay system is actually effective. The study does not
include methods used by commanding and disbursing officers at
individual Marine Corps commands to measure the effectiveness
of their part of the overall system, nor does it attempt to
evaluate the measurement of the efficiency of the system.
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F. METHODOLOGY
The research was conducted by reviewing pertinent
literature on measurement techniques to determine appropriate
criteria to be considered in designing a measurement system.
These criteria were later used to evaluate the effectiveness
measurements used for the pay system.
Interviews with managers at FD and the MCFC and an
extensive analysis of Marine Corps directives and reports
were used to identify pay system goals and the procedures now
used to measure effectiveness. These procedures were then
evaluated to determine how adequately they measure effective-
ness in relation to those goals. Reports listing current
system deficiencies were also used as a basis for evaluating
the measurement techniques. Deficiencies in the measurement
system were identified, and recommendations for improvement
have been made.
Interviews were conducted at the MCFC on 27 and 28 August
1987 and at HQMC on 14 September 1987. The following
officials were interviewed:
- Mr. E. T. Comstock, FDMC
- Col. G. K. Robinson, Jr., Deputy FDMC
- Lt. Col. A. A. Quebodeaux, Assistant Head, Accounting
and Finance Branch, FD (FDF)
- Mr. P. J. Canzano, Head, Finance Section, FDF
- Capt. D. D. Leshchyshyn, Head, Operations Unit, Finance
Section, FDF
- Mr. A. G. Emery, Director, Directorate for Management
Effectiveness and Systems Performance (DMESP) , MCFC
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- Mr. F. C. D. Lucas, Head, Statistical Analysis Office,
DMESP, MCFC
- Mr. S. E. Turner, Director, Directorate of Automated Pay
Systems (DAPS) , MCFC
-Ms. P. A. Hudson, Head, Design Branch, DAPS, MCFC
- Mr. J. R. Pippin, Head, Procedures Branch, DAPS, MCFC
G. ABBREVIATIONS
Several abbreviations are used extensively throughout

















Disbursing Station Symbol Number
Fiscal Division, Headquarters,
U.S. Marine Corps
Fiscal Director of the Marine Corps
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
Joint Uniform Military Pay System/
Manpower Management System
Leave and Earnings Statement
Marine Corps Disbursing On-Site
Examination Teams
Marine Corps Finance Center





H. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The measurement and reporting processes currently in
place do not appear to provide adequate information to
monitor pay system effectiveness appropriately. The perfor-
mance of DOs in contributing to pay system effectiveness is
measured more thoroughly than that of either administrative
offices or the computer. Since administrative offices, not
DOs, are now determining and reporting most of the pay-
related data into the pay system, more emphasis should be
placed on measuring and reporting pay-related administrative
performance. And since the computer, not the DO, determines
in most cases when and how much a Marine gets paid, the
measurement system should provide more information relevant
to the effectiveness of the automated portion of the system.
Most of the emphasis seems to be on measuring the
performance of individual commands rather than the pay system
as a whole. This is not detrimental, but the data gathered
in the measurement process should also be used to provide
information on the accuracy and timeliness of the pay system
as a whole. It also appears that some of the information
being reported to FD is not as useful in monitoring effec-
tiveness as it could be. Some reports should therefore be
modified or deleted entirely.
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I. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
The remaining chapters in this study will answer the sub-
sidiary questions in paragraph 3 above. Chapter II is a
review of literature on measurement systems and identifies
criteria which were used to evaluate the pay system measure-
ment techniques. Chapter III describes the system's major
goals and the measurement procedures currently used to
determine effectiveness. Chapter IV is an evaluation of
these procedures in relation to the criteria shown in Chapter
II. Conclusions of the research and recommendations for
improving the effectiveness measurement system are provided
in Chapter V.
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF MEASUREMENT SYSTEMS
Planning and control are two important activities carried
out by all managers. Planning is deciding what to do and how
to do it; control is ensuring that the desired results are
achieved. Three types of planning and control activities
take place in most organizations: strategic planning, task
control, and management control. Strategic planning involves
setting goals and deciding on the broad strategies to be used
to attain these goals. This type of planning takes place at
the highest levels of an organization. At the lowest levels
are the rules, procedures, and specific tasks necessary to
carry out the day-to-day operation of the organization. Task
control is the process of ensuring that these specific tasks
are performed efficiently and effectively. Management
control lies between these two types of planning and control
activities. It is the means by which management ensures that
the strategies are carried out and the goals are being
attained. [Ref. 3: pp. 4-5]
Part of the management control process consists of
obtaining information on performance and using that informa-
tion to determine the effectiveness of the organization,
i.e., the extent to which it is meeting its goals. These two
activities, measurement and evaluation, allow managers to
determine what is working (i.e., performance contributing to
20
the attainment of goals) and what is not working (performance
which needs to be changed in order to contribute to the
attainment of goals). Knowing this, decision makers have the
capacity to maintain and improve the organization's effec-
tiveness by doing more of what is working and changing what
is not [Ref. 8: pp. 10-11].
Information on effectiveness is obtained by measuring
specific attributes of an organization. The measurement
system used to obtain the information consists of the
attributes to be measured, the process by which they are
measured, the measurements themselves, and the method by
which the measurements are transmitted to management. This
chapter describes various characteristics of measurement
systems that will be used to aid in evaluating the measure-
ment of effectiveness in the Marine Corps military pay
system.
A. WHAT IS MEASUREMENT?
Measurement in a simple form is an assignment process
where numbers are assigned to represent some attribute of an
object or event of interest [Ref. 9: pg. 20]. Objects or
events are related in some way in the real world, and the
measurement process attempts to reproduce that relationship
numerically. For example, a person (an object of interest)
cannot be measured directly; only attributes of that person
such as height or weight can be measured. If one person is
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heavier than another, a relationship between the two exists
in the real world. This relationship can be reproduced
numerically by assigning to each numbers which represent
their weight.
To be useful, measurements must accurately reflect the
real world relationship. In effect, measurement is a lens
through which aspects of objects or events can be viewed.
Evaluating a measurement system can be seen as determining
the quality of the lens. [Ref. 10: pp. 1-2]
But measurement is not used solely to reflect aspects of
real phenomena. Measurements are also made to provide
information to decision makers. To be useful in this
context, the measurements must support the decision-making
process. The proper lens must be used if it is to be of
value. For example, measurements can be taken which ac-
curately represent the height and weight of two people. To
decide which of the two is taller, only the measurements
representing height are of value. The weight measurements,
although accurate, are of no use to the decision maker.
Another level of measurement is evident when qualities or
actions of people in organizations are measured. People can
be motivated to alter their behavior and thereby influence
the measurements. In other words, if people know they are
being measured and will be affected by the results, they may
be motivated to do a better job or perform some other
22
desirable action which they might not otherwise perform. To
be useful in this context, measurement must motivate some
desirable action.
Understanding these aspects of measurement will be
helpful in determining the desirable characteristics of an
effectiveness measurement system. Such a system should use
measurement at all three levels. It should accurately
describe attributes of effectiveness, support the decision
making process, and motivate action to achieve goals.
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF MEASUREMENT QUALITY
To be of use to decision makers, measurements must
accurately describe the attributes they are intended to
represent. The quality of the measurement instrument, the
measurement process, and the measurements themselves affect
the accuracy of the description. For example, a man's height
can be described by having him stand next to a wall, placing
a mark on the wall next to the top of his head, and using a
yardstick to determine the distance from the mark to the
floor. If the yardstick (the measurement instrument) is too
short, the description will not be an accurate representation
of the man's height. If the man is wearing shoes or the mark
is placed next to his ear instead of the top of his head
(part of the measurement process) , the description will not
be accurate. And if the distance is stated in degrees
Fahrenheit instead of inches (the measurement itself) , the
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description will not be accurate. This section discusses
several characteristics which contribute to measurement
quality.
1. Validity
Does the measurement really describe the attribute it
is supposed to measure? Are the relationships between
different measurements the same as the actual relationships
between the objects being measured? These questions refer to
the validity of the measurement process [Ref. 9: pg. 17; Ref.
10: pg. 4]. A process designed to measure accurately the
height of a man is valid if the measurement actually de-
scribes his height and not some other aspect such as his
height with shoes (or his weight or blood type) . If tv/o men
are measured and the result states that the first is taller
than the second, the measurement process is valid if the
first really is. taller. If a different yardstick is used to
repeat the process under the same conditions, and the same
result is obtained, the yardsticks are valid measurement
instruments [Ref. 8: pg. 14],
2. Reliability
Reliability refers to the amount of inherent error in
the measurement process [Ref. 9: pg. 41]. Normally, relia-
bility implies the absence of errors, but if error does exist
in the measurement system, the system can still be reliable
if the error is properly accounted for and controlled [Ref.
9: pg. 16]. Otherwise, a measurement believed to describe
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accurately an attribute may only reflect variances from the
actual state of the attribute caused by error in the system
itself [Ref. 8: pg. 323]. Two aspects of reliability which
can readily be identified are consistency and bias.
Consistency refers to the degree of variation in
results when the same object or event is repeatedly measured
[Ref. 10: pp. 5-6]. If measurements of the same attribute
are taken several times under the same conditions, the
measurements are consistent if the same results are obtained
each time [Ref. 8: pg. 14]. Measuring height is usually
consistent; different yardsticks normally produce the same
results when the same procedures are followed. On the other
hand, measuring the quality of wine by tasting is not nearly
so consistent. Different wine tasters produce more variation
in their measurements of quality because their tastes are not
the same, and one taster may not give the same quality rating
to the same wine if tasted on different days because his
ability to "taste" can differ under certain conditions (e.g.,
if he has a cold)
.
A measurement may be unreliable if it is biased,
i.e., if it distorts the "true" state of the attribute being
measured [Ref. 10: pg . 6]. A short yardstick provides a
distorted measurement of height. Even though the measure-
ments it produces are consistent, they are not reliable
unless the exact amount of "shortness," or error, is known
and is properly accounted for.
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3. Meaningfulness
The concept of meaningf ulness as a measurement
characteristic is much more limited and technical than the
normal idea of meaningfulness [Ref. 10: pg. 6], Measurements
are meaningful if the numerical statements made about them
are meaningful and if logical inferences about the attributes
being measured can be drawn without exceeding the limitations
inherent in the measurements [Ref. 9: pg. 19; Ref. 10: pp. 6-
8; Ref. 11: pg. 83]. Understanding measurement scaling
will help explain this concept. There are four basic types
of measurement scales: nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio.
A nominal scale uses numbers or some other means to
classify attributes. The number 1 can be used to represent
men and the number 2 to represent women. There is no
numerical significance to the numbers. They can be reversed
or otherwise changed, since the only information they
represent is that men are different from women. A statement
like "Since women are 2 and men are 1, women are twice as
good as men" does not make sense; it is not meaningful.
The ordinal scale adds the idea of order to the
numbers. The top ten college football teams are ranked on an
ordinal scale. Two teams can be represented by using the
number 3 to represent the better team (team A) and the number
6 to represent the other (team B) . How much "better" is not
measured; team A is not twice as good as team B. Other
numbers (such as 3 and 8) could be used, and as long as the
26
order is not changed, the information contained in the
measurements is not changed: team A is better than team B.
The interval scale adds the concept of distance
between numbers. The Celsius temperature scale assigns a
specific unit of measure to represent a specific interval of
temperature. Ratio scales contain the additional attribute
of a unique origin or true zero point. The difference
between interval and ratio scales can be better understood by
looking at the difference between measurements of temperature
and measurements of cash. Zero dollars means no cash; it is
a true zero point. Zero degrees Celsius is an arbitrary zero
point set at the temperature where water freezes; it does not
mean no temperature. A cash amount of 20 dollars means twice
as much cash as 10 dollars; the same ratio (2 to 1) is
maintained no matter v/hat scale is used to represent this
amount of cash (e.g., 2000/1000 cents). On the other hand, it
is not meaningful to say that 20 degrees Celsius is twice as
hot as 10 degrees. Transforming the Celsius scale into
degrees Fahrenheit does not maintain the same 2 to 1 ratio:
the equivalent temperatures are 68 and 50 degrees Fahrenheit,
respectively. The information conveyed by the measurements
is that a specific interval exists between them: 10 degrees
Celsius is midway between and 20 degrees; 50 degrees
Fahrenheit is midway between 32 and 68 degrees. [Ref. 11:
pp. 78-84]
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Measurement systems may use different scales for dif-
ferent types of measures. The important point is that in
order to make meaningful statements about the data, the type
of measurement scale and the inherent limitations of the
numbers in that scale must be recognized.
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF MEASUREMENT USEFULNESS
Accurate measurements are of little value if they cannot
be used to support the purpose for which they were made.
Measuring effectiveness should provide information about the
functioning of an organization which is useful to managers in
determining how well the organization is doing in relation to
its goals. The measurement system should also help determine
what is causing the measured level of performance if the
functioning of the organization is to be improved [Ref. 12:
pg. 2]. If a problem is identified, managers should find out
why so that they can correct not only the specific problem
but also the cause of the problem so it won't recur. If
things are working well in one part of the organization but
poorly in another, managers should find out what is producing
the good performance so it can be used throughout the
organization.
The most appropriate measurement of an attribute may be
too difficult and expensive to obtain. Other, less costly
measures should be used in these cases. Even if the informa-
tion is not "perfect," some measure of output is usually more
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useful to management than no measure at all. The important
thing is to recognize the imperfections when using the
information to make decisions. [Ref. 3: pg. 478]
Many characteristics of measurements contribute to their
usefulness. This section describes several important ones:
relevance, understandability, comparability, standards, and
the reporting process.
1. Relevance
Measurements are made for a purpose; they should
contain information that is pertinent, or relevant, to that
purpose [Ref. 10: pg. 9]. In an effectiveness measurement
system the purpose is to determine the extent to which the
organization is attaining its goals. The attributes being
measured must be related to those goals; otherwise the
information the measurements provide is not important for
understanding effectiveness [Ref. 8: pg. 17].
The major goal of a baseball team is to win games.
During a single game, the number of runs scored is relevant;
that is the measurement which determines if that game is won.
At the end of a season, the number of games won is the
measurement that determines if the goal is met. But rele-
vance is not limited to a single measurement that determines
whether or not the goal was attained. Decisions need to be
made on how to achieve the goal; if performance is unsatis-
factory, changes should be made to improve that performance.
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Measurements are relevant if the information they provide is
significant in the decision-making process [Ref. 9: pg. 32].
During the course of the baseball season, the team's
manager must decide which players to use to meet the goal of
winning games. The team must have good hitters, good
pitchers, and good fielders. If the team is not winning, the
manager needs information to help decide if different players
should be used. The ability of each player contributes to
the goal, so measurements of the players' hitting, pitching,
and fielding abilities are relevant.
Two elements of relevance are specification and
timeliness [Ref. 10: pp. 9-10]. Specification involves
deciding what attributes to measure and under what conditions
to measure them [Ref. 11: pg. 84]. To determine whether or
not a player is a good hitter, what measurements should the
manager use? Some possibilities are the player's batting
average, the number of runs he has batted in this season, and
the number of hits he has had against left-handed pitchers.
These are relevant measurements, since the manager can use
them to make decisions about when to use this player to help
the team win games. Other aspects of the player, such as his
height and grade point average in high school, are not
relevant — they are of no help to the manager in attaining
the goal.
Measurements must also be timely if they are to be
helpful in decision making. Useful information which is not
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available until after it is needed is not relevant for that
decision [Ref. 3: pg . 479]. If a manager wants to win a
baseball game, he can't wait until the end of the game to
find out how many runs his team has scored. He needs to make
decisions during the course of the game, and he needs to know
the score during the game in order to make the right deci-
sions. The final score is not timely or relevant in this
case.
Measurements can also be untimely if they are not
available until after the attribute they describe has changed
[Ref. 10: pg. 10]. A player's batting average last season is
not relevant to decisions made during this season. The
manager needs to know how the player is performing now .
2. Under standabil it
v
The user of the measurement must be able to perceive
its significance [Ref. 10: pp. 10-11]. There is no point in
providing information to someone who doesn't understand it.
Measurements stated in detailed, technical terms may be
understandable to technicians who are familiar with that
precise language; but, if the information is to be used by
someone else, a more general though less precise description
of the measurement is probably desirable [Ref. 8: pg. 322].
For example, describing a man's height as 1725.3 millimeters
is not as understandable to an American as saying he is about
5 feet 8 inches tall.
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A measurement term can also mean different things
under different circumstances. An "error" in a pay record
might mean that the person has received the wrong amount of
pay. It might also mean that a mistake exists which has not
yet caused an erroneous payment but will if the mistake is
not corrected. Another possibility is that a mistake exists,
such as the wrong copy of a document is filed in the record,
but it does not affect the amount of pay the person is
entitled to receive. When the number of "errors" is reported
to managers, it is important that they understand which type
of error the measurement describes.
3. Comparability
If information about similar attributes, or about the
same attribute at different points in time, will be compared
in the decision-making process, the measurements of those
attributes should be comparable [Ref. 3: pg. 480; Ref. 8: pg.
11]. The decision maker may not make appropriate comparisons
if the measurements were made using different processes or
under different circumstances. To determine which of two men
is taller, their height should be measured the same way:
with or without shoes, in centimeters or in inches. To
determine if there are more errors in pay accounts this month




In order to know if an organization has attained its
goals or is performing in a manner which will enable it to
attain its goals, measurements must be taken of relevant
attributes at various times. Depending upon the specific
wording of the goals, these measurements may or may not be
enough to indicate effective performance. When goals are
stated in broad terms such as "to win baseball games" instead
of "to win 90 games this season," the decision maker must
compare the measurements made of current performance against
some standard or desired level of achievement for the
attribute being measured.
Since a manager wants the team to win all its games,
it may be appropriate to state the team's goal that way: to
win games. But it would be unrealistic to say that the team
is ineffective if it loses only one game during a 162-game
season. A standard should be set; i.e., effectiveness should
be defined in specific terms such as "the team is considered
effective if it wins at least 90 games this season." When
the season is half over, the manager can compare the number
of games already won with the standard: the team is being
effective if it has won at least 45 games. If only 40 games
have been won, the manager should make changes to improve
performance. The standard allows the manager to monitor the
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team's progress throughout the season so he knows either that
the team is performing effectively or that something needs to
be done to improve effectiveness.
5. Reports
The information provided by measurements must be
transmitted to the decision makers who will use it. The
adequacy of reporting that information is a major factor
which influences measurement usefulness [Ref. 8: pg.17]. The
method, completeness, and timeliness of reporting contribute
to its adequacy.
The method of reporting is related to understanda-
bility. Management must understand not only the measurements
themselves but also the way they are presented in the
reports. The medium used should be one the user can relate
to [Ref. 8: pg. 18]. The significance of several pages of
data should be summarized in a few paragraphs. A full page
of written information can sometimes be reduced to a simple
graph. Only the information that is actually needed by
management should be reported; if too much data is shown,
there is a tendency to ignore the whole report [Ref. 3: pg.
513]. Attention may be focused on trivial data instead of
the important information helpful to management.
Sometimes not enough information is reported. In
many large organizations relevant information exists but is
not provided to the managers who could use it [Ref. 3:
34
pg. 514] . If relevant measurements are made and would be
helpful to management, they should be included in the
reporting process.
Measurements are made to aid in decision making. Not
only must the measurement be timely, but also the reports
must be made available in time to assist in any decisions
that might be required, even if accuracy suffers. A measure-
ment which reveals a problem is of no use if it is not
reported soon enough to correct the problem. Approximately
accurate measurements which are reported in time for manage-
ment to take action are much more preferable than precisely
accurate ones which are not reported until long after
anything can be done about the problems they uncover [Ref. 3:
pg. 515].
D. MOTIVATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MEASUREMENT
An organization's effectiveness is affected by the
attitudes and behavior of the people in the organization and
by the quality of the work they perform. People perform at a
certain level because they want a particular outcome to take
place (their preferences) and because they believe their
performance will achieve that outcome (their expectations).
No matter how much they would like the outcome to occur, it
is not likely that they will work hard if they do not expect
it to happen. [Ref. 13]
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The measurement of effectiveness is also affected by
these behavioral aspects of the organization. People can be
motivated to perform desirable actions if they know they will
be affected by the results of the measurements [Ref. 10: pg.
151. Recognizing the motivational characteristics of
measurements allows managers to determine if the measurement
system itself is contributing to or detracting from the
organization's effectiveness. Two important characteristics
are controllability and distortability.
1. Controllability
A measurement is controllable if the person whose
performance is being measured can influence the object or
event that is reflected by the measurement [Ref. 10: pp. 16-
17]. If an individual feels responsible for the result of
the measurement, he is more likely to be motivated to
influence that result than if he doesn't believe his behavior
determines the outcome.
Objectivity plays a part in how much control an in-
dividual has in the measurement process [Ref. 10: pg. 17].
If the measure is objective and the individual understands
how the measurement is calculated it is easier to relate his
performance to the result of the measurement. If the measure
is subjective, the connection between performance and result
is not so easy to see; the measurement is not nearly as
controllable.
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Subjective measures, however, should not be over-
looked. Judgments made by capable people are usually better
measures of quality than numerical, objective measures. For
example, a subjective judgment of beauty is probably far
superior than a numerical representation. Quality of
performance is extremely difficult to measure objectively. A
qualified person can take into account the circumstances
causing a certain level of performance when making judgments
about quality. Even though these subjective measures are not
"perfect," some acceptable measures of quality should be
used. [Ref. 3: pp. 472-477]
2. Distortability
Measurements which can be influenced directly by the
person being measured may be changed before being reported.
In these cases, the information reported is not representa-
tive of the actual attribute being measured but is a dis-
torted view of reality which the individual has chosen to
report. Measurements made using questionnaires or interviews
are susceptible to distortion. Erroneous information can be
entered into the measurement system if proper controls are
not in place. Managers must be aware of the possibility of
distortion when using information provided by these types of
measurements. [Ref. 10: pp. 17-19]
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III. CURRENT METHODS OF MEASURING EFFECTIVENESS
There is no single report used by top-level Marine Corps
financial management to determine the effectiveness of the
pay system. The FDMC and his staff in FD use several
methods to gauge effectiveness, ranging from official reports
to informal telephone calls. This chapter describes the
methods currently used by FD to monitor effectiveness. These
methods will be evaluated in chapter IV by reference to the
measurement system characteristics discussed in the last
chapter.
The FDMC's main concerns regarding the pay system are
accuracy and timeliness, so pay system effectiveness as used
in this thesis means accurate and timely pay. Exactly what
is meant by accurate and timely pay is not specifically
defined for the pay system as a whole. Standards have been
set, however, for some measurements which will be described
later in this chapter.
A broad meaning of accuracy would be that Marines should
be paid no more and no less than that to which they are
entitled. Timely pay means not only that Marines should be
paid on payday, but also that changes in entitlements should
be reflected in paychecks within a reasonable period of time
after the change is effective. The definition of "reasona-
ble" depends on the circumstances of the payment. Marine
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Corps policy generally provides that Marines will be paid
what has been reported into the pay system; DOs may adjust
system-generated payrolls if a change hasn't been reported or
processed within 60 days after it became effective [Ref. 7].
A reasonable period of time in the normal sense would
probably mean as soon as possible but not more than 60 days.
But if a Marine is being discharged, all changes should be
reflected in the final payment to prevent overpayments that
can't be recovered. A reasonable period of time in this case
means immediately.
Accuracy is measured in several ways and reported to FD
in a number of reports. Timeliness of pay is not specifical-
ly measured but is indirectly considered as part of some
measurement methods. The methods used fall into three
categories: (1) the MCDOSET Program, (2) the Disbursing
Performance Standards Program, (3) other reports and miscel-
laneous methods.
A. THE MCDOSET PROGRAM
The MCDOSET Program is administered by FD and consists of
two teams (East Coast and West Coast) which perform examina-
tions of Marine Corps commands to evaluate their disbursing
function and that part of their administrative function
associated with military pay. Each team is composed of
disbursing and administrative experts headed by a lieutenant
colonel who reports directly to the Head of the Accounting
39
and Finance Branch at FD. Each major command (generally
those with 500 or more Marines) is examined annually; other
Marine Corps units are examined biennially.
Examinations are conducted using an extensive set of
standard procedures to provide uniformity between the two
teams and among the members of each team. Examinations of
commands without DOs have two phases, an administrative
service record phase and an administrative internal control
phase; commands with DOs are also examined in a disbursing
PFR phase and a disbursing internal control phase. The
results of the examinations are reviewed with the commander
of the unit being examined and then reported to FD.
1. Administrative Service Record/Disbursing PFR Phases
Personnel records are audited in these phases to
determine pay-related errors for which either the administra-
tive office or the DO is responsible. The audit is conducted
primarily in the administrative office by reviewing service
record books containing leave and earnings statements (LESs)
and other pay-related documents. A random sample of records
is chosen using statistical procedures developed at the MCFC;
these records are then audited to detect errors. An error
would be charged if the administrative office or the DO made
a mistake in reporting a pay-related event, failed to report
something they should have reported, or failed to correct an
error for which they must initiate corrective action.
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Two types of errors are defined. Monetary errors
have actually resulted in a mispayment; advisory errors may
result in mispayments if they are not corrected. Dollar
values of actual and potential over- and underpayments are
also calculated. Separate statistics are kept for adminis-
trative errors and disbursing errors. The percentage of
monetary errors caused by each office is determined and
reported separately as the command's administrative and
disbursing error rates.
2. Administrative/Disbursing Internal Control Phases
The administrative or disbursing office's internal
controls, policies, and procedures are reviewed in these
phases to determine if they comply with applicable Marine
Corps directives. MCDOSET interviews administrative and
disbursing personnel, reviews written operating procedures
and other documents, and observes the functioning of each
office, using standard checklists and subjective judgments to
determine the extent to which internal controls are effective
and efficient. There is no objective "error rate" associated
with these phases; however, any deficiencies in specific
areas of the internal control procedures are noted.
3. Reports
The results of each examination are discussed with
the commander of the unit being examined and then reported to
FD. (See Appendix A for a sample report.) The report is
divided into several parts. The cover letter contains a
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summary of the results, showing the administrative and
disbursing office's percentage of monetary errors (the
"official" error rate), percentage of advisory errors, and a
statement of the extent to which each office's internal
controls complied with the requirements of applicable
regulations ("substantially," "for the most part," etc.).
Separate enclosures detail the results of each phase of the
examination.
The number of errors and actual or potential dollar
values of mispayments are shown in the enclosures, broken
down into specific areas of pay (e.g., basic allowance for
quarters) . Areas of internal controls which are deficient are
also noted (e.g., promotion procedures or timeliness of
reporting) . Significant findings which identify problem
areas and their causes, as determined by the examination
team, are reported separately; recommendations are also made
on how to correct the problems. The report is forv/arded to
FD via the examined command, which must endorse the report
and state specific corrective action taken on each of the
significant findings. FD reviews each report, ensuring
action has been taken on the findings and looking for trends
which might indicate a Marine Corps-wide problem.
Annual summaries of all the examinations are reported
to FD by each MCDOSET (see Appendix B) . These summaries
contain the overall administrative and disbursing error rates
and internal control findings identified by each team, as
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well as enclosures showing the most common errors and problem
areas identified during the year. The MCFC issues an annual
comparative analysis of the MCDOSET results, with summaries
of the combined statistics, comparisons with previous years'
results, and certain statistical analyses (see Appendix C)
.
B. DISBURSING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS PROGRAM
Five areas which represent measurable functions performed
by DOs are monitored under this program: (1) separated
Marines' PFRs, (2) master military pay accounts (MMPAs) ,
which are the official JUMPS/MMS pay accounts, (3) the
disbursing PFR phase of MCDOSET, (4) reenlistment vouchers,
and (5) travel vouchers. Since travel payments are not part
of the military pay system being reviewed in this thesis,
travel vouchers will not be included here.
An accuracy rate goal, or performance standard, for each
area has been established by the FDMC as a standard indica-
ting acceptable performance. Accuracy rates are determined
for each DO and for the Marine Corps as a whole during audits
performed by MCFC or MCDOSET at various times. The results
of the audits are reported to the DOs and to FD. Semian-
nually, MCFC sends a summary report of the previous six
months' audits to FD (see Appendix D) . The FDMC then sends
reports to the commanding generals of the audited Marine
Corps commands, with details of their DOs' performance
measurements.
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Periodically, the Disbursing Performance Standards
Program is reevaluated to determine if the accuracy goals
should be adjusted, if a measured area should be deleted or a
new one added, or if other changes should be made to improve
the program. The reenlistment voucher area was recently
added to the program as a result of one such evaluation.
(Appendix D does not contain a section on this area because
it had not yet been included in the program.) Although this
program does not attempt to measure all pay-related areas
(such as administrative office performance as part of the pay
system) , the FDMC uses it as a major indicator of the
effectiveness of the pay system [Ref. 5].
1. Analysis of Separated Marines' PFRs
When a Marine is discharged or otherwise separated
from active duty, the DO maintaining that Marine's PFR
computes the amount due at separation and makes the final
payment. The PFR is then forwarded to MCFC, where it is
audited along with other pertinent data to determine if the
final payment was accurate. Errors in the final payment
computation are identified and analyzed to determine the
reason for the error. Monthly reports are issued to each DO,
with a detailed summary reported to FD (see Appendix E)
.
The report to FD contains the accuracy rate for final
payment computation for the Marine Corps as a whole and for
each DO (identified by disbursing station symbol number, or
DSSN) . It also shows the number of errors in computation and
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dollar value of under- and overpayments broken down by DSSN
and reason. Graphs are included showing the accuracy rates
for each DSSN for that month and the monthly Marine Corps
accuracy rates for the previous year. The semiannual report
to FD shows the average accuracy rates for the previous six
months for each DO and the Marine Corps as a whole, along
with a graph comparing the rate of each DO with the perfor-
mance standard.
2. MMPA Audit Analysis
The MCFC audits printouts of a random sample of 75
pay accounts from each DO during one month each quarter to
determine if the accounts contain proper and accurate data.
Errors are identified and reported to the DO, with a semian-
nual summary report to FD (see Appendix F)
.
The summary report contains accuracy rates and the
number, dollar value, and types of errors resulting in over-
and underpayments for each DO and the Marine Corps as a
whole. Also included are totals for advisory errors (those
not resulting in mispayments) by type and totals for errors
attributable to administrative offices. The semiannual
performance standards report to FD shows the average accuracy
rates for the previous two quarters for each DO and the
Marine Corps as a whole, along with a graph comparing the
rate of each DO with the performance standard.
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3. MCDOSET Disbursing PFR Phase
The monetary error rate determined during the
disbursing PFR phase of the annual MCDOSET examination is
converted into an accuracy rate (100% minus the error rate)
and included in the report of the Disbursing Performance
Standards Program for the second semiannual period of each
fiscal year. Only the accuracy rate attributable to DO
performance is included; administrative performance is not
part of this program.
4. Analysis of Reenlistment Vouchers
When Marines reenlist, they may be entitled to
payments for reenlistment bonuses or for unused leave; if
they have used too much leave, it becomes "excess" and monies
must be deducted from their pay. Reenlistment vouchers are
completed by the administrative office and forwarded to the
DO, where any payments due are computed and paid. The
vouchers are then forwarded to the MCFC, where they are
audited to ensure that applicable regulations were followed
when completing them and that payments were computed accu-
rately.
The results of the audits are reported monthly to the
DOs, with a summary report to FD (see Appendix G) . Disburs-
ing and administrative monetary and advisory errors are
reported. The FD report contains data on the number,
percentage, causes, and dollar values of errors for each DO
46
and the Marine Corps as a whole as well as graphs depicting
certain statistical comparisons, such as the total error rate
and the DO monetary accuracy rate.
This area was recently added to the Disbursing
Performance Standards Program. The semiannual performance
standards report to FD will show the average DO monetary
accuracy rate for the previous six months for each DO and the
Marine Corps as a whole, along with a graph comparing the
rate of each DO with the performance standard.
C. OTHER REPORTS AND MISCELLANEOUS METHODS
FD uses several other reports and methods to help gauge
pay system effectiveness. Although these are not part of a
specific program of evaluation, they provide information on
aspects of the system not included in the MCDOSET or Disburs-
ing Performance Standards Programs.
1. Overpayments Processed by Separations Branch
A monthly report results from the MCFC audit of PFRs
for separated Marines (see Appendix H) . It is different from
the report under the Disbursing Performance Standards Program
in that it includes only overpayments and it includes all
overpayments, not just those attributable to a DO miscalcula-
tion of a final payment. Other reasons include Marines
already in an overpaid status when they are discharged
because of a prior overpayment and Marines who are separated
before the end of their normal enlistment and must have
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certain monies recouped (such as unearned reenlistment
bonuses or excess leave) . The report identifies the total
number and dollar value of overpayments, broken down by
category and cause.
2. Analysis of Out-of-Balance MMPAs
This monthly report identifies pay accounts which
have been "out of balance" (underpaid or overpaid by $50 or
more, as reflected in the computer MMPA record) for nine
months or longer. Since the report is the product of a
computer data base inquiry and not a detailed audit, the
Marines may or may not be actually over- or underpaid (in
other words, there could be a valid reason the computerized
record is out-of-balance) . Information on specific accounts
is sent to the DO maintaining the account, where it is
reviewed to determine what, if any, corrective action is
needed.
The summary report to FD (see Appendix I) contains
statistical information for each DO and the Marine Corps as a
whole on the number and dollar value of the "overpaid" and
"underpaid" accounts. An "accuracy rate," which indicates
the percentage of accounts which are not "out-of-balance," is
included.
3. LES Sample Audits
Every month DO personnel audit a 5% random sample of
their PFRs to determine if system deficiencies (mistakes in
computer system design or programming) are causing errors in
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the pay accounts. LESs are maintained in the PFRs and
display data in the pay accounts; errors on the LESs,
therefore, reflect errors in the accounts. DOs report to
MCFC the number and types of errors detected and whether the
errors can be attributed to the DO, the administrative
office, or the "system." The MCFC analyzes this information,
determines if computer deficiencies do in fact exist, and
makes plans to correct the deficiencies.
The purpose of this audit is to determine if previ-
ously unknown system deficiencies exist without requiring an
audit of all LESs each month, as was done before 1986. When
a deficiency is discovered, the MCFC determines its cause and
then identifies all pay accounts affected by that deficiency.
Any errors in accounts not in the 5% sample can then be
corrected.
The MCFC also reports the results of the monthly
audits to FD (see Appendix J) . The report contains sum-
marized data on the number and percentage of errors found by
each DO in the sampled LESs, the results of a statistical
analysis of the data, and the results of the MCFC's analysis
of the errors attributable to the "system."
4. System Assurance Officer (SAO) Quarterly Status
Report of JUMPS/MMS Deficiencies
When computer system deficiencies are discovered, the
MCFC must analyze them to determine their cause and then
schedule them for correction. The analysis and corrective
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action may take a few days or many months. The commanding
officer of the MCFC has been designated the SAO and must
notify all DOs of the deficiencies and provide instructions
for overcoming them until they can be corrected [Ref. 7].
When a significant deficiency is discovered, DOs and admin-
istrative offices are notified immediately in an "SAO
message" issued by MCFC. MCFC also provides a quarterly
report to DOs and FD which lists the status of all deficien-
cies discovered since the last report and of the deficiencies




Agencies outside the Marine Corps, such as GAO and
the Naval Audit Service, periodically examine various aspects
of the pay system. These examinations can range in scope
from a general review of the entire system to a detailed
audit of a specific item such as accounting for leave. The
reports of these audits provide FD with information on the
effectiveness of the system.
The Marine Corps must conduct an annual system mana-
ger/user review of the pay system and report the results to
the Department of the Navy. The MCFC reviews the operation
and performance of the system against specific accounting
requirements provided by the Comptroller of the Navy to
determine if the pay system complies with established
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accounting principles, standards, and related requirements.
This review is used by FD as one indication of. the effective-
ness of the pay system. [Ref. 2]
FD also receives ad hoc reports as needed from the
MCFC, from staff agencies at HQMC, and from field commands.
These special-purpose reports can provide information on
specific issues relating to pay system effectiveness which is
not contained in the normal recurring reports described
above.
6. Miscellaneous Methods
Various other methods are used by FD to monitor the
effectiveness of the system. DOs, MCDOSET, and MCFC provide
verbal and written feedback regarding policy and procedural
changes, quality of education and training in pay-related
occupations, and other issues of concern. Complaints about
certain aspects of the system are received during field
visits by FD personnel, at various conferences, from Inspec-
tor General inspections, and from phone calls and written
correspondence received at HQMC.
These informal methods do not provide quantitative
measures of effectiveness, but they are, nevertheless,
considered important indicators of problems. As expressed
during interviews with FD personnel, "if there are lots of
complaints, something must be wrong."
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT METHODS
In this chapter the measurement system characteristics
described in Chapter II will be used to evaluate the methods
the Marine Corps uses to measure pay system effectiveness.
Each method presented in Chapter III will be examined to
determine the extent to which measurement quality, useful-
ness, and motivational capability exist. Each method may
have more than one purpose (e. g., the MCDOSET examinations
provide information to the command being examined as well as
to FD; other reports are used as management tools for
individual DOs) . Only the aspects related to the overall pay
system goals of accuracy and timeliness will be analyzed
here.
The quality characteristics of the methods will be
examined first to see if the measurements accurately describe
the attributes they are intended to represent. The useful-
ness of the measurements will then be analyzed to see if they
support the purpose for which they are made. The purpose of
the measurements, from FD's viewpoint, is to determine and
monitor pay system effectiveness and to discover the reasons
for the measured level of effectiveness so improvements can
be made where needed. Motivational characteristics will also
be examined to see if the measurements can be affected,
either positively or negatively, by the behavior of people.
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This analysis will provide the basis for determining if the
current methods, either in whole or in part, adequately
measure the accuracy and timeliness of the pay system.
Conclusions of the analysis and recommendations for improving
the measurement of effectiveness will be presented in
Chapter V.
A. THE MCDOSET PROGRAM
1. Administrative Service Record/Disbursing PFR Phases
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val iditv . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? The audit of a
sample of service records in these phases is intended to
measure the rate at which the administrative and disbursing
offices commit pay-related errors. The sample is chosen by
using a statistical sampling design; the percentage of errors
found in the sample is a statistically valid measurement of
the percentage of errors actually contained in the service
records.
(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? The audits are conducted by highly
qualified disbursing and administrative personnel using
Standard procedures to provide consistent, unbiased results.
Although the MCDOSET examiners undoubtedly make some mis-
takes, they are selected for the job because of their
expertise and experience. Because they are highly qualified,
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the extent of inherent error in their examinations is
minimized to an insignificant level. The inherent error
resulting from auditing a sample rather than all records is
known, since the sampling design is chosen to obtain a given
precision level. The process provides a reliable measurement
of the rate of pay-related errors in the service records.
(3) Meaningfulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? Errors are
counted on a ratio scale and presented as a percentage of
records with errors, also a ratio scale. If there are 10
records with errors in office A and 5 in office B, office A
has twice as many records with errors as office B. An office
with a 10% error rate did not necessarily make twice as many
errors as one with a 5% error rate; however, it did make
errors twice as often.
b. Measurement Usefulness
(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
these phases relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? The audits measure the rate at which administra-
tive and disbursing offices have committed errors which
either have resulted in a mispayment (monetary error) or may
result in a mispayment (advisory error) . The existence of a
monetary error means there has been a loss of accuracy in the
pay system; the existence of an advisory error means there is
the potential for a loss of accuracy. This information is
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therefore relevant to the measurement of pay system accuracy.
The results -of each audit are also timely; they are available
immediately after the examination.
(2) Under standability . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? The results of the audit
of each office are stated as a percentage of personnel
records containing each type of error. The definitions of
each type of "error" are specifically stated and should be
easily understood. The significance of a 10% monetary error
rate in an administrative office should easily be understood:
10% of that office's records contain one or more errors which
have resulted in a mispayment. Although not a part of the
"official" error rate, advisory errors can be significant
because they reflect mistakes in such categories as leave
accounting which, if not corrected, can result in high
dollar-value mispayments.
The contribution of an individual office's error
rate to the accuracy of the overall pay system is not so easy
to understand. The extent to which a specific office
contributes to errors in the overall system depends on the
number of records that office maintains. If an office has
10,000 records and a 5% error rate (500 records with errors),
it contributes more to inaccuracies in the pay system than an
office with 1000 records and a 10% error rate (100 records
with errors) . The results of all the audits must be
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aggregated to use the measurements as an indication of the
accuracy of the overall pay system; the significance of the
error rate should then be easily understood.
(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions? Audit
procedures are standardized to the maximum extent possible
between the East and West Coast MCDOSETs and among the
members of each team. The results of one examination can
therefore be appropriately compared with the results of
another, even if it was not performed by the same team or
team member. The definition of "error" and the examination
process has been changed in recent years, however. Before
fiscal year 1984 the error rate included all errors, even if
it did not affect the amount of pay a Marine did or would
receive. In 1984 and 1985 the reported error rate included
both monetary and advisory errors; the two types were not
differentiated. In 1986 the current definitions of errors
were used during the examinations. Before fiscal year 1986,
the disbursing portion of the audit was conducted by examin-
ing documents in PFRs, not personnel records, and the PFRs
contained far fewer documents in 1985 than before. Audit
results beginning in 1986 are, therefore, not comparable with
prior years.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? The pay system goal of
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accuracy implies 100% accurate payments: no monetary errors.
Although this level of performance may be desired, it is
unrealistic to achieve; so, the FDMC has established a
standard (currently 96% accuracy, or a 4% error rate) for the
MCDOSET disbursing PFR phase as part of the Disbursing
Performance Standards Program. This standard indicates an
acceptable level of accuracy. A standard of 94% accuracy had
been established for the MCDOSET service record phase, but
this standard has not actually been used to describe accep-
table administrative performance in this area, probably
because even 94% accuracy has been extremely difficult to
achieve (the overall pay system administrative accuracy rate
for FY86 was 87%). The results of the two phases are not
combined into a single error rate for each command, and there
has been no standard established for the accuracy of the
overall pay system.
(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? The results of these phases of the MCDOSET
examinations are submitted to FD in four types of reports.
The first is the report of each individual examination, which
is written by MCDOSET and sent to FD via the examined command
(see Appendix A) . This report consists of a cover letter
with summarized information of the results, the monetary and
advisory error rates of the administrative and disbursing
phases. Causes of significant error trends in each phase
are stated in enclosures to the report, along with
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recommendations for corrective action. Specific details
(e.g., total number of errors discovered, the dollar value of
actual mispayments, and the number of errors caused by
computer deficiencies) are also included in enclosures to the
report. This method of presenting the results of each
examination is understandable because the important informa-
tion is readily identifiable. The main points (the error
rates) are shown at the beginning of the report, significant
findings are singled out with causes and recommendations also
shown, and the details are included separately. The report
is available to FD within three months of the examination.
The information provided by this report is of
most use to the examined command. Individually, the reports
do not show FD the effectiveness of the overall pay system;
they can be used, however, to determine the contribution of
specific commands to the overall accuracy of the system.
Aggregation of the data in all the reports would provide
information on the accuracy of the overall system.
A second type of report showing the results of
the service record/PFR phases is the annual summary prepared
by each MCDOSET (see Appendix B) . These two reports cover
the examinations conducted by each team throughout the
previous fiscal year. Each report consists of a cover letter
stating the overall disbursing and administrative monetary
("chargeable") error rates determined by the team, with
separate enclosures showing the most common errors and totals
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of the statistics contained in the individual reports.
Unlike the individual reports, the percentage of advisory
errors is not shown in the cover letter but roust be picked
out in the detailed enclosures. The error rates of indi-
vidual commands are not shown. The reports are usually
available within a month after the end of the fiscal year and
provide FD with separate data from each team; they must be
combined to provide information on the overall pay system.
The third report is the annual comparative
analysis of the HCDOSET results prepared by the MCFC (Appen-
dix C) . This is the only report which shows some combined
data from the two MCDOSETs and is usually available within
three months after the end of the fiscal year. The report is
not meant to be an overall summary of the data from both
MCDOSETs, so it does not show the overall error rates in the
cover letter (the overall monetary error rate is shown as
part of an enclosure) . Instead, it provides an analysis and
statistical comparison of the various categories of errors
from the two annual MCDOSET summaries. Enclosures provide
other information, such as the number and dollar value of
overpayments and underpayments from monetary errors broken
down by administrative/disbursing phases and category of
error. Graphs are used to depict visually the significance of
various reasons for underpayments and overpayments. No
information is included on advisory errors. An enclosure
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attempts to compare the results of examinations in previous
years even though these data are not truly comparable (see
section (3) above)
.
The fourth report shows only the annual results
of the disbursing PFR phases and is submitted as part of the
Disbursing Performance Standards Program (Appendix D) . It
shows a summary and graph of the monetary accuracy rates,
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? The audits in
these phases are performed to find errors made by administra-
tive and disbursing personnel. Even an error caused by a
computer deficiency will be "charged" to disbursing if it has
not been corrected, because the DO is responsible for finding
these types of errors. The audit is objective; when an error
is found, MCDOSET can easily show what it is and how it was
determined. Errors are well-defined, and the error rates
are easily calculated. The measurements are controllable
because the errors are directly attributable to the people of
the command being examined. Even if an error was actually
made by a previous command, the current administrative or
disbursing office should have discovered the mistake during
its review of the records when the Marine joined the command.
The annual MCDOSET examination provides an incentive for
proper behavior.
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(2) Distortability . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? The results of the audits are
not easily distorted. Either an error exists or it doesn't.
MCDOSET finds the errors and, since they are independent of
the command being examined (they work directly for FD) , they
are not likely to be influenced to overlook errors purposely
or change the results of the audit.
2. Administrative/Disbursing Internal Control Phases
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val iditv . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? The review of
an office's internal controls, policies, and procedures in
these phases is intended to measure the extent to which they
comply with applicable regulations. Although the measurement
is subjective, with no numerical value assigned, the on-site
nature of the review and the reliance on a variety of
measurement methods (direct observation, review of written
policies, interviews) allows MCDOSET to make a fairly valid
determination of the office's compliance.
(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? The reviews are conducted by highly
qualified disbursing and administrative personnel using
standard procedures and checklists to minimize inconsisten-
cies. The measurements themselves are subjective and are
based on the experience and expertise of the MCDOSET person-
nel, not on an objective "error rate" based on number of
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errors or discrepancies found. The measurement is not as
reliable as the error rates determined in the service
record/PFR phases. It does provide, however, a formal and
systematic measurement of the quality of the procedures used
by administrative and disbursing personnel in the operation
of the pay system.
(3) Meaningf ulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? None; there
is no number assigned to the measurements. Statements such
as "fully", "substantially", and "for the most part" com-
pliant are used instead. This results in a verbal form of
ordinal scale, where fully compliant is "better" than
substantially compliant, etc. How much better can not be
determined.
b. Measurement Usefulness
(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
the measurements relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? The pay-related policies and procedures pre-
scribed by Marine Corps directives are intended, among other
things, to help ensure that Marines are paid accurately and
timely. The extent of compliance with these directives is,
therefore, one indication of the ability of an administrative
or disbursing office to contribute to overall pay system
accuracy and timeliness. The internal control phases of the
MCDOSET examinations provide information that is relevant to
pay system effectiveness. One specific measurement in this
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phase (the percentage of unit diary entries reported in
excess of ten days after the action occurred) is directly
related to pay system timeliness.
(2) Under standability . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? Deficiencies in specific
areas of internal control procedures are not merely dis-
covered during the examinations; MCDOSET also explains the
causes and effects of the deficiencies. For an individual
office, the significance of this measurement is fairly easy
to understand. The adequacy of an office's internal controls
contributes to adequacy of the overall pay system's internal
controls, but the extent of that contribution is not easily
understood from the results of the examinations. Since there
is no numerical measurement, aggregation of the data is not
possible. If two-thirds of the commands examined are
substantially compliant with regulations and one-third is
not, does this mean that the internal controls of the overall
pay system are substantially compliant? It depends on the
size of the commands. What significance does the weakness of
a specific area of internal control have on the effectiveness
of the overall pay system? It depends on the extent of the
effect of that weakness on accuracy and timeliness. These
things are not easily understood from the measurements.
(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions?
Examination procedures are standardized as much as possible;
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the review of a specific area of internal control is per-
formed in much the same way by each team. The final deter-
mination of the extent of compliance is largely subjective
and is not as readily comparable as the error rate determined
in the service record/PFR phases. A determination of
weakness is not based solely on statistics, and the causes of
weakness may be different for each command examined.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? The implied goal here is full
compliance with regulations. There is no standard or
specifically stated level of acceptable performance. If a
command is compliant for the most part, is this acceptable?
At what point is performance unsatisfactory or unacceptable?
(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? The individual report of examination
(Appendix A) consist of a cover letter containing the extent
of compliance and the areas of weakness. Enclosures contain
significant findings with causes and effects of specific
weaknesses and a table showing the areas of internal control
which were reviewed and which ones were considered deficient,
including the percentage of untimely unit diary entries for
individual administrative offices in the command. The method
of presentation is easy to understand; the main points are
identified first, with details readily available. This
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report is of most use to the individual command, however,
since by itself it does not contain sufficient information on
overall pay system effectiveness.
The annual summary prepared by each MCDOSET
(Appendix B) contains enclosures explaining the most common
types of deficiencies determined by each team during the
fiscal year and a table showing areas of administrative
internal control considered deficient throughout the year.
There is no determination of the extent of compliance which
combines the results of all examinations, nor is a combined
percentage of untimely unit diary entries computed and shown.
These two reports provide much useful information on defi-
cient areas of internal control, but they do not indicate if
overall pay system internal controls are adequate. The
annual comparative analysis of the MCDOSET results (Appendix
C) does not cover the internal control phases. FD does not
really have a concise report of the overall results of these
phases of the MCDOSET examinations.
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? The review of
internal controls determines the adequacy of the behavior of
people in complying with regulations. The measurement of the
extent of compliance, although subjective, provides an
incentive for proper behavior. When problem areas are
identified, corrective action must be taken. Since FD
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monitors the individual reports to ensure that weaknesses are
strengthened, the command has an incentive not only to follow
proper procedures but also to correct deficiencies when they
are identified.
(2) Distortability . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? A lot of the measurement
process consists of observing and interviewing personnel
during a very short period of time (a few hours to a few
days, depending on the size of the command). Weaknesses can
possibly be "hidden" from MCDOSET during this time by giving
misleading information to the team members. The expertise
and experience of MCDOSET personnel minimizes the extent of
distortability, but it still exists because of the nature of
the examination process.
B. THE DISBURSING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS PROGRAM
1. Analysis of Separated Marines' PFRs
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val iditv . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? The monthly
audit of all PFRs of Marines separated from active duty is
intended to determine the percentage of PFRs containing
errors made by DOs in computing the final settlement payment.
It does not measure the total percentage of Marines who are
overpaid at separation, since a Marine can already be in an
overpaid status at the time of discharge for a number of
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reasons not related to a DO's mistake in computing the amount
due at separation. The audit is a valid measurement of
mistakes made by DOs only and of the mistakes made at the
time of separation only.
(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? The audit is conducted by MCFC person-
nel using standard procedures to provide consistent, unbiased
results. There is no sampling error, since all PFRs are
audited. Mistakes in auditing are minimized because the same
qualified personnel perform the audits each month.
(3) Meaningfulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? Errors are
counted on a ratio scale and presented as a percentage of
PFRs with errors, also a ratio scale. A DO with 4 errors
made twice as many mistakes as a DO with 2 errors; a DO with
an error rate of 4% made errors twice as often as a DO with a
2% error rate.
b. Measurement Usefulness
(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
the measurements relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? The existence of an error in a separated PFR
means the final payment was inaccurate; the Marine was either
underpaid or overpaid. The measurement is therefore relevant
to overall pay system accuracy.
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(2) Under standability . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? As part of the Disburs-
ing Performance Standards Program, this measurement deals
with the performance of DOs only. Marines can be overpaid or
underpaid at separation because of mistakes made by admin-
istrative offices also, as well as for reasons not caused by
either office. Also, a mispayment made the month before
discharge which causes the Marine to be overpaid and not be
entitled to a final payment is not considered an error in
this audit. The audit is strictly a measurement of the
ability of the DO to compute final settlement payments
accurately. However, from the presentation of the data in
the report, it is not readily apparent that this audit
determines mispayments made only by DOs and only at the time
of separation.
(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions? The
audits are performed by the same office using the same
procedures each month. The measurements are comparable.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? A standard has been set
(currently 98% accuracy) for this part of the Disbursing
Performance Standards Program to indicate acceptable
performance.
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(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? The monthly report to FD (Appendix E)
contains a table summarizing the error and accuracy rates of
each DO and the Marine Corps as a whole. Amounts of mispay-
ments are not summarized in this table; they are shown in
separate enclosures which provide detailed statistics on the
number, types, and dollar value of errors causing under- and
overpayments for each DO and the overall Marine Corps. There
is a lot of detailed data (there are 43 different types of
errors) but no analysis of the information. A graph compares
the accuracy rates of DOs against each other and the Marine
Corps average (not the 98% standard) . Another graph shows
the average Marine Corps accuracy rate for each month of the
current fiscal year.
The specific information portrayed by the data is
difficult to understand just by looking at the report. For
example, enclosure (1) contains columns on the total number
of PFRs processed; the number and percentage of final
settlements required, frauds, and PFRs reviewed; the number
of PFRs rejected for monetary and advisory errors; the error
and accuracy rates; and the number of PFRs received by the
MCFC in an overpaid status. There is no indication that the
error and accuracy rates are computed by using the number of
PFRs reviewed column and the total of the two columns under
number of PFRs rejected. There is no definition of advisory
errors elsewhere in the report, but PFRs with these errors
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are included when computing the error and accuracy rates
shown. The total number of errors shown in the other
enclosures is not necessarily the same as the total number of
PFRs rejected, because a PFR may contain more than one error.
The significance (or insignificance) of the number of PFRs in
an overpaid status is not explained. In enclosure (1) to the
sample report in Appendix E, the first row of data shows that
this DSSN had an accuracy rate of 100%, yet 10% of the PFRs
(16 of 158) were in an overpaid status. Is this information
significant? Most of the information in this report appears
to be of more use to analysts at the MCFC than to managers
at FD.
The semiannual report of the Disbursing Perfor-
mance Standards Program (Appendix D) contains summarized
information of the monthly audits, including a graph compar-
ing DOs against each other and the 98% standard. A brief
written summary of significant statistical information is
also included, as well as a graph comparing the Marine Corps
averages of the current and previous semiannual periods with
the standard.
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? This audit is
performed to find errors made by disbursing personnel. The
results are directly attributable to their behavior.
Specific errors are reported to the DO which made the error
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to show how the error was determined. Since the error rate
is objective, includes only errors which are caused by the
DO, and is reported to both FD and the commanding general of
the DO's command, the measurement is extremely controllable
and motivates desired behavior.
(2) Distortabilitv . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? For this audit, either an
error exists or it doesn't. MCFC personnel determine the
errors; they are not likely to be influenced to change the
results or overlook error, since they are independent of the
DOs. The measurements are not easily distorted.
2. MMPA Audit Analysis
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val iditv . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? This audit by
MCFC of a sample of 75 accounts from each DO during one month
each quarter is intended to determine the percentage of pay
accounts which contain errors caused by DOs. Statistical
sampling methods are used and estimated error rates are
statistically determined from the sample data. But only
certain types of errors can be determined by reviewing pay
account printouts in a central location like the MCFC.
Although the purpose of the audit is intended to be similar
to the that of the PFR phase of MCDOSET examinations, overall
error rates determined by the MMPA Audit Analysis are
consistently much lower than those determined by MCDOSET.
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The types of errors listed as reasons for over- and underpay-
ments indicate that this audit actually measures only (or at
least primarily) errors associated with a change in duty
station. This audit does not appear to be a valid measure-
ment of pay accounts containing all types of errors caused by
DOs.
(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? The inherent error in the sampling
process is controlled statistically when the estimated total
error rates are determined. The measurements are conducted
by MCFC personnel using standard procedures to provide
consistent results. However, since the audit does not
identify all errors, even though it is apparently intended to
do so, the measurement is biased and therefore unreliable as
an indicator of MMPA accuracy. The true error rate in the
overall pay system will be higher than the error rate
determined by this audit, since not all errors are included.
(3) Meaningfulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? Errors are
counted on a ratio scale and presented as a percentage of
errors, also a ratio scale. A DO with 10 errors made twice
as many mistakes as a DO with 5 errors; a DO with an error




(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
the measurements relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? If the audit measures the rate at which DOs have
made errors associated with a change in duty station, the
information is relevant. Errors are labeled monetary and
advisory, but, unlike the definition used for MCDOSET,
"monetary errors" include those resulting in potential as
well as actual mispayments. Still, an error means an
inaccurate payment has been or might be made. The informa-
tion is, therefore, relevant to pay system accuracy.
(2) Under standability . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? Because the measurement
does not appear to be valid for its stated purpose, its
significance is not easily understood. Appendix F contains a
sample report which states "less than three percent (2.62%)
of the active duty pay accounts in the master file contain
potential monetary discrepancies." However, this audit does
not measure all potential monetary errors, only those
attributable to DOs and apparently only those associated with
a change in duty station.
(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions? The
audits are performed by the same office using the same
procedures each month; the results are therefore comparable
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with those of other MMPA audit analyses. They are not
comparable with MCDOSET results, however, since the examina-
tion process and conditions are not similar.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? A standard has been set
(currently 96% accuracy) for this part of the Disbursing
Performance Standards Program to indicate acceptable
performance.
(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? Since the results of the audits apparently
do not convey the information intended, the reports of those
results are not useful. The reporting process itself is not
at fault; the data are reported but not the information
desired.
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? The audits do
determine errors caused by disbursing personnel, and the
results are directly attributable to their behavior.
Specific errors are reported to the DO which made the error
to show how the error was determined. Since the error rate
is objective, includes only errors which are caused by the
DO, and is reported to both FD and the commanding general of
the DO's command, the measurement is extremely controllable
and motivates desired behavior.
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(2) Distortabilitv . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? As with the Analysis of
Separated Marines' PFRs, these measurements are not easily
distorted.
3. MCDOSET Disbursing PFR Phase
This part of the Disbursing Performance Standards
Program is discussed in Section A.l above.
4. Analysis of Reenlistment Vouchers
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val iditv . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? The measurement
of errors on reenlistment vouchers is intended to determine
the percentage of vouchers which contain monetary errors
Caused by DOs (DO monetary error rate) as well as the
percentage containing any errors, monetary or advisory, made
by administrative and disbursing personnel (command error
rate) . Only the DO monetary error rate (converted to an
accuracy rate by subtracting it from 100%) is used in the
Disbursing Performance Standards Program; and this rate is
only an estimate of the actual error rate and, therefore, of
questionable validity.
Since a voucher may contain more than one error,
the total number of errors is usually greater than the number
of vouchers containing errors. A monetary error may result
in more than one mispayment (payments can be made for a
reenlistment bonus of for unused leave) , so the total number
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of DO monetary errors may be more than the number of vouchers
containing these types of errors. Rather than keeping track
of which vouchers contain DO monetary errors, an estimated
error rate is computed by the following rationale: if 20% of
the vouchers contain errors (the command error rate) and 10%
of the total errors are DO monetary errors , then an esti-
mated 2% (10% x 20%) of the vouchers contain DO monetary
errors. This rationale implies that monetary errors are
distributed proportionately among the vouchers with errors.
This is not necessarily true. For example, if 50 vouchers
are audited, 15 errors of all types are found on a total of
10 vouchers, and 2 of the errors are DO monetary errors, the
DO monetary error rate is determined to be 2.67% (10/50 = 20%
of the vouchers contain errors; 2/15 = 13.33% of the errors
are DO monetary; so 13.33% x 20% = 2.67% of the vouchers
contain DO monetary errors) . In reality, the 2 DO errors
could have occurred on 1 or 2 vouchers, so the true error
rate is either 2% or 4%. Keeping track of the number of
vouchers containing DO monetary errors would provide a much
more valid measurement than the estimate now used.
(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? The method of auditing is consistent.
The use of an estimate, however, results in a biased or
distorted measurement of the true DO monetary error rate,
since there is no way to determine the amount of inherent
error caused by the use of the estimate. In the above
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example, the measured rate of 2.67% is either .67% higher or
1.33% lower than the true rate. Different examples would
produce different ranges of inherent error. The overall
reliability of the measurement must therefore be questioned.
(3) Meaningfulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? Errors are
counted on a ratio scale and presented as a percentage, also
a ratio scale. A DO with 2 monetary errors made twice as
many mistakes as a DO with 1 error; a DO with an error rate
of 4% made errors twice as often as a DO with a 2% rate.
b. Measurement Usefulness
(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
the measurements relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? The existence of a DO monetary error means a
loss of accuracy in the pay system. This information is
relevant.
(2) Under stand ability . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? The significance of the
use of an estimate instead of the actual DO monetary error
rate is not explained and therefore not easily understood.
(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions? The
audits are performed using the same procedures. The condi-
tions resulting in the determination of an error rate,
however, are not necessarily similar. Two DOs can have the
same computed percentage of vouchers with DO monetary errors
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even if the true percentages are different. In the above
example, the same 2.67% error rate would be computed for an
office which made one mistake on two different vouchers (a
true rate of 4%) as for one which made two mistakes on one
voucher (a true rate of 2%) . Because the measurements are
not totally valid, any comparisons must also be questioned.
If the measurements were valid, they would be comparable.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? A standard has been set
(currently 98%) for the DO monetary accuracy rate (100% minus
the error rate) to indicate acceptable performance. An
average Marine Corps command error rate is also computed, but
no standard has been set for this measurement or for admin-
istrative performance.
(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? The monthly report consists of a cover
letter with the overall DO monetary and command accuracy
rates and other significant statistical information. A table
summarizes the data by DSSN, and graphs are included showing
the DOs monetary accuracy rates compared with each other and
the Marine Corps average (not the standard), the monthly
average Marine Corps DO monetary and command error rates
since April 1987, and other information concerned with
reasons for monetary errors. Other enclosures provide
details on the types and dollar values of errors. The main
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points are included in the cover letter, and the summaries
and graphs present the data in a manner fairly easy to
understand. A lot of the detailed data appears to be of more
use to MCFC analysts than to managers at FD.
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? The results of
the audits are directly attributable to the behavior of
disbursing and administrative personnel. Specific errors are
reported to the DO or administrative office which made the
error to show how the error was determined. Since the DO
error rate is objective, identifies which office caused the
error, and is reported to both FD and the commanding general
of the DO's command, this measurement is extremely control-
lable and motivates desired behavior. Measurement of
administrative errors are not as controllable.
(2) Distortabilitv . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? As with the other audits
conducted by MCFC personnel, these measurements are not
easily distorted.
C. OTHER REPORTS AND MISCELLANEOUS METHODS
1. Overpayments Processed by Separations Branch
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val iditv . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? This monthly
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report is intended to identify the number and amount of
overpayments at discharge and the primary reasons for the
overpayments. It includes all overpayments, not just those
resulting from an inaccurate final settlement payment or
those caused by a DO. For example, the leading reason for an
overpayment at discharge is the recoupment of a reenlistment
bonus required when a Marine is discharged early, i.e.,
before the end of the period for which the bonus was paid.
All PFRs are audited when a Marine is separated from active
duty, a Marine is either overpaid or not, and the reason for
the overpayment can be identified; the results present a
valid measurement of the number of and reasons for
overpayments.
(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? There is no sampling error, and the
measurements are made by MCFC personnel using standard
procedures to provide consistent, reliable results.
(3) Meaningf ulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? A ratio scale
is used, so normal arithmetic comparisons can be made.
b. Measurement Usefulness
(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
the measurements relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? The existence of an overpayment may or may not
indicate that the pay system has been inaccurate or untimely.
Marines who are discharged early can be overpaid because
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monies must be recouped for unearned reenlistment bonuses or
for advanced leave which becomes excess at discharge. The
overpaid condition is the result of adjustments required by
administrative policy decisions. These causes are not the
result of an inaccurate or untimely pay system. But other
reasons for overpayments include untimely stopping of
allotments or of the direct deposit of payments (caused by a
DO, an administrative office, or the inability of the comput-
erized system to respond in time) , untimely reporting of pay-
related information by the administrative office before the
DO calculates the final payment, and inaccurate calculation
of the final payment by the DO (measured in the Analysis of
Separated PFRs part of the Disbursing Performance Standards
Program) . These reasons for overpayments are the result of
an inaccurate or untimely pay system. So, although the
report is extremely useful in determining the amount and
reasons for overpayments, only part of the information
provided by this measurement of overpayments is relevant to
pay system effectiveness.
(2) Understandabilitv . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? Overpayments at separa-
tion are easy to understand: the former Marine owes money to
the Marine Corps which may or may not be recovered. The
categories of overpayments (payments, bonus recoupments,
etc.) are relatively easy to understand, although the source
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(policies such as early discharge, untimely reporting by an
administrative or disbursing office, or inaccurate computa-
tion by a DO) is not readily apparent.
(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions? Yes.
However, the measurements are not comparable with the results
of the Analysis of Separated PFRs portion of the Disbursing
Performance Standards Program, since that analysis is limited
to only one source of overpayment.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? No goal or standard has been
set for this report.
(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? The monthly report consists of a cover
letter with an analysis of significant data, such as the
major categories of overpayments. Enclosures include a
summarized listing of the dollar value of overpayments,
according to category, for each month of the current fiscal
year; tables of the number and amount of overpayments because
of early discharges, according to category and month; and
tables of overpayments identified by DOs rather than by MCFC
personnel. The cover letter summarizes an analysis of the
important information contained in the enclosures (except the
total number and amount of overpayments). The report
contains a lot of data. No graphs are used, so comparisons
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of the data are difficult to visualize. Since PFRs are sent
to the MCFC by DOs , some data are presented by DSSN; this
presentation could be erroneously viewed as an implication
that the DO is responsible for the overpayments,
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? Only some of the
measurement data are the result of the behavior of people in
the pay system. As a whole, this measurement is not very
controllable.
(2) Distortabilitv . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? As with the other audits
conducted by MCFC personnel, these measurements are not
easily distorted.
2. Analysis of Out-of-Balance MMPAs
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val idi ty . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? This measure-
ment from a computer data base inquiry provides data on MMPAs
which have been out-of-balance for a period of nine months or
longer. The term "out-of-balance n means that at the end of a
month the MMPA reflects a either a positive or negative
balance of $50 or more. This does not mean that a Marine has
been over- or underpaid for at least nine months; it probably
means that the DO has been manually adjusting the computer-
generated payment data. There can be many reasons for the
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adjustment which are not determinable from the measurement
process. This analysis is a valid measurement of MMPAs which
are "out-of-balance" , since that is strictly a condition
related to data in the computer data base. It is not a valid
measurement of mispayments.
(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? There is little or no inherent error;
the data are generated by a computer program.
(3) Meaningfulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? The data are
measured using a ratio scale, so normal arithmetic com-
parisons can be made.
b. Measurement Usefulness
(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
the measurements relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? The existence of an out-of-balance account does
not necessarily mean a payment has been inaccurate or
untimely. It does mean that the MMPA data have been manually
overridden, presumably because the data are inaccurate and
manual adjustments are necessary to make correct payments.
Data on individual accounts are provided as a management tool
to the DOs maintaining those accounts. Monthly summaries of
those data are provided to FD. The DOs can determine the
reason for the out-of-balance conditions, but this informa-
tion is not required to be reported and is not provided as
part of the report. The data may be relevant to an
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individual DO in helping to monitor the functioning of the
office (e.g., to make sure that manual adjustments are in
fact necessary) . Without specific information on the reasons
for the out-of-balance conditions, however, this measurement
is not relevant to overall pay system accuracy or timeliness.
(2) Under standability . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? A negative MMPA balance
normally means that a Marine has been overpaid, and a
positive balance that the Marine is underpaid. But these
conditions could also mean that data in the MMPA are incor-
rect, i. e. the Marine has been paid correctly but the data
in the computer pay account are wrong. Normally, the Marine
will be paid according to the data in the MMPA alone, but if
the data are incorrect for more than 60 days, DOs are
authorized to adjust the data and pay the correct amount. If
the MMPA is out-of-balance for nine months or longer, the
likelihood is that the condition exists because the MMPA data
are wrong and manual adjustments have been required to
prevent over- and underpayments. The significance of the
out-of-balance condition is not easily understood.
(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions? Yes.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? No standard has been set.
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(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? The monthly report presents negative
balances as "overpayments" and positive balances as "under-
payments." Since the out-of-balance condition does not
necessarily mean a mispayment has occurred, this is not a
true representation of the meaning of the measurement.
"Error rates" and "accuracy rates" are shown, but these terms
are not explained. The existence of an out-of-balance
account does not necessarily indicate that an error has been
made by the DO, so the term "error rate" is not appropriate
here. A lot of data are presented, but their meaning is
misrepresented.
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? The reason for an
out-of-balance MMPA may be beyond the control of DO personnel
(e.g., a computer program deficiency may have caused the
condition) . The measurement is not very controllable by DOs.
(2) Distortabilitv . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? Since the measurement is
strictly a data base inquiry, it cannot be easily distorted.
An out-of-balance MMPA can be prevented by paying strictly
according to the data in the MMPA, whether or not the data
are correct. Even if this were done, the measurement of out-
of-balance accounts would still be correct, since it is not a
measurement of accuracy but one of data.
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3. LES Sample Audits
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val iditv . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? The main
purpose of these audits is to determine if system deficien-
cies (mistakes in computer system design or programming)
which have not already been identified are causing errors in
pay accounts. Another measurement made is the percentages of
errors attributable to the system, the administrative office
(identified as commanding officer or CO errors) , or the DO.
DOs perform the audit and notify the MCFC of any errors found
in the sample of LESs and whether the errors were caused by
the computer system, the DO, or the administrative office.
The MCFC determines if the errors which the DO attributes to
the system are in fact caused by system deficiencies and
whether or not those deficiencies had been previously
identified.
The measurements made from the results of the
audit itself (i.e., the number of each type of error) are not
necessarily valid. The total number of errors found is
probably a valid representation of error conditions identifi-
able by a DO from the data on the LES; but the number of each
type of error cannot be determined until after the MCFC has
determined if the "system" errors reported by the DOs are
actually caused by computer deficiencies.
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(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? The audit process is not necessarily
consistent between DO personnel at the same office, among the
different DOs, or from one month to the next. The audits are
performed by personnel of varying amounts of knowledge and
experience. A highly knowledgeable and experienced person
will find more errors and identify the correct type of error
more often than one who is less knowledgeable or experienced.
The audits are often performed under time constraints which
cause further inconsistencies.
The measurement is also biased if it is used to
determine the total percentage of errors in the pay system;
many errors (such as the failure of an administrative office
to report certain data) cannot be determined by the DO during
the audit of LESs. The error rate determined during these
audits is, therefore, lower than the "true" error rate in the
overall pay system. These audits do not appear to provide
very reliable measurements of overall error rates in the pay
system.
(3) Meaningfulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? The measure-
ments are made on a ratio scale, so normal arithmetic
comparisons can be made.
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b. Measurement Usefulness
(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
the measurements relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? The existence of an error identified by these
audits means that the data in the pay account are inaccurate.
The cause of that error is also relevant. Although the
audits provide useful information to help MCFC identify
system deficiencies, the relevance of the information they
provide must be questioned because the measurements are not
very valid or reliable as indicators of overall accuracy. If
the data were valid and reliable, they would then be rele-
vant.
(2) Under stand ability . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? An error identified by
these audits does not necessarily indicate that a Marine has
been mispaid; erroneous data may exist in the pay account,
which data might cause a mispayment in the future or might
not directly affect payments. This is not clear. System
errors as identified by DOs may or may not be caused by
actual system deficiencies; the data must be analyzed by the
MCFC before that determination can be made. Of the actual
system errors, only some were caused by "new" system defi-
ciencies, ones that were not previously identified. This
information is not readily apparent.
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(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions? The
same basic process is used to audit the LESs, although the
level of expertise of the personnel performing the audits
varies. An office which uses a team of experienced personnel
(such as the DO quality assurance section) to audit the LESs
will provide higher quality information to the MCFC than an
office which doesn't. The time frame allowed for performing
the audit also varies from month to month and from DO to DO.
Comparability must therefore be questioned.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? No standard has been set.
(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? The report ( Appendix J) consists of a cover
letter which highlights the main points and provides results
of a statistical analysis. Enclosures contain a table
summarizing the number, type, and percentage (error rate) of
errors by DSSN, a listing of system errors reported by the
DOs, and the results of the MCFC analysis of these errors
(i.e., whether or not the error was really caused by a system
deficiency, whether or not it was previously discovered, and
what action is being taken to correct the deficiency) . The
report identifies a "system error rate" as the percentage of
accounts with system errors as determined by the DO, not
after the final determination of the MCFC. Although the main
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purpose of the audit is to determine if new system deficien-
cies are causing errors, the report does not break down the
system error data into "new" and "old" categories.
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? The errors caused
by system deficiencies are not the result of the behavior of
administrative or disbursing personnel. The CO and DO type
errors are. Since the main purpose of the audit is to find
system deficiencies, the audits would not be considered very
controllable by administrative and disbursing personnel.
(2) Distortabilitv . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? Yes. DO personnel may be
hesitant to report errors caused by the DO. They may also
provide erroneous data on all errors because of improper or
hasty auditing, especially if they are under a time con-
straint to complete the audit. The measurements appear to be
highly distortable. Of course, this does not mean that the
likelihood of purposeful misrepresentation is high, only that
the possibility to do so exists.
4. SAO Quarterly Status Report of JUMPS/MMS Deficiencies
a. Measurement Quality
(1) Val iditv . Do the measurements really
describe what they are supposed to describe? SAO messages
and the quarterly status report do not actually "measure"
anything, but they do provide information on computer system
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deficiencies which are valid descriptions of the deficien-
cies. The number of SAO messages which are released and the
number of deficiencies listed in the report may provide a
valid measurement of the number of deficiencies , but they do
not by themselves measure the impact of those deficiencies on
the pay system; i.e., they do not indicate the number of pay
accounts affected or the dollar amount of any mispayments
which might occur. Estimates of this information are made at
the MCFC on a Project Analysis/Evaluation (PAE) form for each
discrepancy as an aid in determining if the deficiency should
be corrected immediately or, if not, in prioritizing its
correction. These measurements are "best guess" estimates
made by using data retrievals, management reports, and other
information available to the analysts at the MCFC. Although
exact figures cannot be obtained, the PAE estimates appear to
be the best measurement of the potential loss of pay system
effectiveness if system deficiencies are not corrected.
However, these measurements are not summarized and reported
to management.
(2) Reliability . Is there inherent error in the
measurement process? The number of SAO messages and the
number of deficiencies listed on the Quarterly Status Report
is a reliable measurement of the number of deficiencies but
not their impact. The measurement of their impact (i.e., the
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data on the PAEs showing the population affected and dollar
value of potential mispayments) is relatively consistent; the
same procedures are used to provide estimates.
(3) Meaningfulness . What meaningful numerical
statements can be made about the measurements? Ratio scales
are used, so normal arithmetic comparisons can be made,
b. Measurement Usefulness
(1) Relevance . Is the information provided by
the measurements relevant to overall pay system accuracy or
timeliness? SAO messages and the quarterly status report
provide information on computer system deficiencies. Some
deficiencies cause errors which have resulted in inaccurate
or untimely pay; others would cause inaccuracies if they were
not corrected or if manual adjustments were not made to
override the computer-generated payment data. Measurements
of these deficiencies are, therefore, relevant to the
effectiveness of the overall pay system.
(2) Understand ability . Is the significance of
the measurements easily understood? The SAO messages and the
Quarterly Status Reports by themselves probably do not
provide enough information to fully understand the signif-
icance of deficiencies in the automated system. Information
which could be provided by summarizing and reporting the data
on PAEs would add substantially to the understandability of
these measurements.
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(3) Comparability . Are the measurements made
using the same processes and under similar conditions? The
PAE estimates are computed using the same procedures.
(4) Standards . Can the measurement be compared
to a goal or standard to indicate if an acceptable level of
performance is being achieved? No standards have been set to
indicate an acceptable number of deficiencies or define
acceptable performance of the automated portion of the
system.
(5) Reports . Are the measurements adequately
reported to FD? Although individual SAO messages are sent to
FD, no summarized reports are provided. The Quarterly Status
Report does not contain a summary of the data in the listing.
Relevant information on PAEs are not reported at all.
c. Motivational Characteristics
(1) Controllability . Can the conditions being
measured be affected by people's behavior? Deficiencies are
caused by mistakes in system design and programming, actions
performed by people. The connotation of "computer system
deficiency," however, is an error made by the computer , not
by people. Errors caused by disbursing and administrative
personnel are usually linked to those personnel; they are
motivated to perform better because the measurements are
considered reflections on their performance. Errors caused
by computer design and programming personnel, however, are
usually associated with the computer. There is no direct
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link between the measurements and the people who made the
mistakes, so the measurement process itself does not neces-
sarily motivate better performance; the errors are not
controllable.
(2) Distort ability . Can the measurements be
purposely reported improperly? These measurements are not
easily distorted. Once a deficiency is known to exist, all
pertinent information about that deficiency will likely be
reported.
5. Other Reports and Miscellaneous Methods
The quality, usefulness, and motivational capabili-
ties of the other reports and methods used by FD to gauge pay
system effectiveness will not be analyzed here. GAO, NAS,
and ad hoc reports are unique; their characteristics depend
on the specific report and would have to be examined indi-
vidually. Different requirements for conducting the annual
system manager/user review have been established each year,
so the characteristics of each review would have to be
examined separately. Verbal and written feedback from the
MCFC, MCDOSET, and individual DOs provide a lot of informa-
tion, but its quality and usefulness must be established
separately for each piece of information obtained. The
number of complaints may or may not indicate a loss of pay
system effectiveness; each complaint has to be judged on its
own merit.
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Although no attempt has been made here to analyze
these methods of measuring effectiveness, it is important to
perform some similar evaluation before relying on them.
Analysis can and should be done on an individual basis;
otherwise decisions may be made using information which is
not appropriate for the particular situation.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This chapter presents the conclusions of the thesis and
answers the primary question presented in Chapter I: Do
current measurement techniques provide top-level financial
management officials with sufficient information to adequate-
ly monitor pay system performance? The answer is no, not
yet. The measurement and reporting processes do not now
provide the information which appears to be needed. Con-
clusions will be presented to support this part of the
answer. But the measurement techniques, with some modifica-
tions, are capable of providing sufficient information. At
the end of the chapter, several recommendations will be made
to help improve the effectiveness measurement system.
A. CONCLUSIONS
The Marine Corps military pay system is comprised of
people, procedures, and computers. The effectiveness of the
system depends on the proper functioning of all three parts.
The accuracy and timeliness of pay are the system's major
goals; measuring these attributes determines how effective
the system is. An effectiveness measurement system should,
therefore, measure the extent to which the people, the
procedures, and the computer contribute to accuracy and
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timeliness. Do the current methods of measuring effective-
ness do this adequately? Not entirely, as the following
discussion shows.
1. People
The performance of people is measured in a number of
ways. The MCDOSET examinations are the most thorough
measurement of this part of the pay system. These examina-
tions provide quality measurements which, for the most part,
are extremely useful for determining and monitoring effec-
tiveness. There are perhaps three areas of the MCDOSET
program lacking in usefulness. First, the program is almost
entirely set up to measure the performance of individual
commands rather than the overall pay system. Administrative
and disbursing office statistics are computed separately, and
individual reports are not adequately consolidated to
determine an overall error rate. This is not necessarily
bad, but it limits the reports' usefulness in measuring
overall performance. Second, there is no standard (not even
an implicit standard such as "satisfactory" or "unsatis-
factory") for the internal control phase of the examination,
nor is there an attempt to provide a measurement of the
effectiveness of internal controls for the pay system as a
whole. Third, although timeliness is a major goal and
aspects of timeliness are measured as part of the internal
control phase, no overall timeliness measurement is reported.
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The Disbursing Performance Standards Program provides
measurements of disbursing personnel performance. There is
no similar measurement of the performance of administrative
personnel, even though they report most of the information
into the pay system. The HMPA Audit Analysis does not
measure what it is intended to measure. The Analysis of
Separated Marines' PFRs and the Analysis of Reenlistment
Vouchers provide measurements of only disbursing performance
in these areas: a 2% published error rate does not necessari-
ly mean there are only 2% errors, because errors caused by
the administrative office are not included. This fact is not
easy to understand. Thus, computation of the error rate for
the reenlistment voucher analysis is less than desirable.
The other reports also provide information on the
performance of people, but not all of it is necessarily
useful as a measure of effectiveness. Part of the Overpay-
ments Processed by the Separations Branch report is relevant
to pay system effectiveness, but this part is not broken out
separately. The MMPA Out-of-Balance report does not appear to
be relevant at all; at least, any part that may be relevant
cannot be determined from the report itself. The LES Sample
Audit report shows data on CO and DO type errors — people
performance — which attempt to provide information similar
to that in the MCDOSET service record and PFR phases.
MCDOSET does a much more accurate job.
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In summary, there are a lot of useful measurements of
people performance being made. The methods of measuring and
reporting tend to place the major emphasis on the performance
of individual commands rather than the overall pay system.
Some of the measurements are not really relevant to overall
pay system accuracy or timeliness and should not be used as
an indication of effectiveness.
2. Procedures
There is only one real measurement of the procedures
part of the pay system: the internal control phase of
HCDOSET. Since there is no standard for this phase, it is
difficult to determine if the effectiveness of the procedures
is or is not acceptable, especially for the system as a
whole. The MCDOSET examinations only determine if the
procedures of field commands comply with those required by
regulations; there is no measurement of the effectiveness of
the regulations themselves. The MCDOSET method of measuring
procedures may be subjective, but it is probably the best




The accuracy of the computer is touched upon in three
separate areas. As part of the MCDOSET PFR phase, errors
caused by system deficiencies and not corrected by the DO are
determined. These are "chargeable" to the DO, but they
provide one measurement of computer accuracy. This informa-
tion is not readily identifiable 'or explained. The LES
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Sample audits, with the MCFC analysis, provide information on
errors caused by computer deficiencies. The reports, may be
misleading, however, because the data shown on the reports
are consolidated before the MCFC finishes its analysis. SAO
messages and Quarterly Status Reports also provide informa-
tion, but specific data on the PAEs which would be extremely
useful in measuring effectiveness are not reported. In
short, the contribution of the computer to the accuracy and
timeliness of pay is measured sufficiently, but the informa-
tion that is reported is either misleading or incomplete.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. MCDOSET
a. Consolidated information gathered during the
MCDOSET examinations should be presented in a report showing
the effectiveness of the overall pay system, in terms of
accuracy and timeliness as measured by MCDOSET. Administra-
tive and disbursing office effectiveness, as measured by both
teams in the service record/PFR and internal control phases,
should be consolidated at a summary level and reported to FD
at least quarterly.
b. A standard should be set for the measurement of
internal controls, and a method for measuring overall
effectiveness for these phases should be determined.
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c. A method for showing the results of timeliness
measurements should be developed, a standard established, and
the results reported separately as a major item on the
report.
2. Disbursing Performance Standards Program
a. A determination should be made of exactly what
the MMPA Audit Analysis measures, and it should be described
accurately on the report. If this can't be done, delete the
report from the program. This doesn't necessarily mean to
stop the analysis, since it does uncover errors which should
be corrected. But it shouldn't be used as part of a perfor-
mance measurement program if one cannot determine exactly
what performance is being measured.
c. A lot of the detailed data should be deleted on
the individual reports of the Analyses of Separated Marines
PFRs and Reenlistment Vouchers; instead, summarize the
information quarterly and provide an analysis of error trends
at that time.
d. The error and accuracy rates for the Analysis of
Reenlistment Vouchers should be correctly computed, even if
this means changing the audit process slightly. If the
measurement is to be used in the Performance Standards
Program, it should be accurate.
102
3. Other Reports
a. The Overpayments Processed by the Separation
Branch report should be reformatted to separate the overpay-
ments attributable to the pay system from those that are not,
or this information should be reported separately.
b. The MHPA Out-of-Balance Report should be deleted.
Individual DOs may need the reports for management purposes,
but it serves no useful purpose as a measurement of
effectiveness
.
c. In the LES Sample Audits, the requirement for
keeping statistics on "CO and DO type errors" should be
deleted. MCDOSET provides similar information more accurate-
ly. "System error rates" should not be shown until after
the MCFC analysis determines the DO-reported errors are in
fact caused by system deficiencies. Separate statistics
should be maintained on "new" and "previously identified"
deficiencies.
d. A summary of the information contained in the SAO
messages and Quarterly Status Report should be provided. For
example, in the quarterly report, a table could be provided
showing the number of system deficiencies identified during
the previous quarter, the number corrected, the number
scheduled for correction, and the number still unresolved.
e. The PAE estimates of the number of pay accounts
affected and the dollar amount of mispayments should be sum-
marized and reported. The actual and potential mispayment
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data should be reported separately. Although these data are
only estimates of actual or potential mispayments (i.e., some
of the errors and mispayments will not actually occur since
the deficiencies will be corrected or manually overcome) ,
they are the best quantified information concerning the
impact of deficiencies in the computer system. A method
should be devised to assign an estimated error or accuracy




A counterpart to the Disbursing Performance Standards
Program which measures administrative performance should be
developed. If this recommendation is not feasible, at least
measure some areas of administrative performance for the pay
system as a whole. In other words, instead of sampling
records from and maintaining statistics on individual
administrative offices, as is done for disbursing offices,
develop measurement methods which will indicate overall
system performance in specified areas. Even if respon-
sibility for errors is not fixed, FD will have an indication
that things are or are not right with overall administrative
performance. More research can be done if major problems are
uncovered.
5. Report of Pay System Effectiveness
All the measurements of overall pay system effective-
ness should be combined into a single quarterly or semiannual
report. Data on individual offices would not be shown, only
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the "bottom line" measurements indicating the accuracy and
timeliness of the various parts of the overall pay system.
This report would provide the FDMC with a concise measurement
of the effectiveness of the Marine Corps military pay system.
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
DISBURSING ON-SITE EXAMINATION TEAM. WEST COAST
MARINE CORPS BASE





To: Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps (Code FDD), Washington D. C. 20380
Via: Commanding General, i
Subj: REPORT OF DISBURSING ON-SITE EXAMINATION
Ref: (a) MCO 7220. 13D
(b) CMC ltr 7250 FDD-jtt dtd 7 Mar 86
Encl: (1) Findings and Recommendations - Administrative Examination
(2) Summary of SRB Phase
(3) Summary of Internal Control Phase - Administrative
(4) Graph Summary of Administrative Error Rates
(5) Findings and Recommendations - Disbursing Examination
(6) Summary of PFR Phase
(7) Statistical Analysis of SRB/PFR Phase
1. The Marine Corps Disbursing On-Site Examination Team, West conducted the
examination directed by references (a) and (b) from 21 April through 21 May 1986.
2. The purpose of the examination was to evaluate the disbursing function and
that portion of the administrative function concerned with military pay and
allowances to determine compliance with applicable regulations. The examination
included a detailed review of a random sample of personnel records as well as a
comprehensive review of the internal control measures used in administering the
Joint Uniform Military Pay System/Manpower Management System (JUMPS/MMS).
3. Administration. Our evaluation revealed that 16 percent of the personnel
records we examined contained monetary errors that resulted in mispayments. We
also found that 11 percent of the personnel records contained advisory errors that
could result in mispayments if not corrected. Internal controls, policies, and
procedures for the most part complied with the requirements of applicable
regulations and directives. Some internal control measures, however, need to be
strengthened, particularly in the areas of unit diary reporting (timeliness)
promotion procedures, and TAD rations (DOPMA BAS). Deficiencies noted during the
administrative portion of our examination are presented in enclosure (1).
Enclosures (2) through (4) further detail the results of the administrative
examination.
4. Disbursing. Our examination also revealed that three percent of the
personnel records we examined contained monetary errors chargeable to the
disbursing officer that resulted in mispayments. We also found that less than
one percent of the personnel records contained advisory errors that could result
in future mispayments if not corrected. Internal controls, policies, and proce-
dures in support of disbursing operations were substantially compliant with the
requirements of applicable regulations and directives. Deficiencies noted during
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Subj: "REPORT OF DISBURSING ON-SITE EXAMINATION
our examination are presented in enclosure (5). Enclosure (6) further details
the results of the disbursing examination.
5. Enclosure (7) provides a statistical analysis of the errors detected during
the personnel records examination.
6. We discussed the results of the examination with the Chief of Staff including
the deficiencies and recommendations contained in this report. We provided the
Disbursing Officer and each Commanding Officer a discrepancy notice for each
error detected during the review of personnel records. We advised them that each
error must be corrected, the discrepancy notice endorsed, and returned to this
office within 30 days. Additionally, we furnished them copies of the checklists
used to evaluate internal controls and advised them that any discrepancy listed,
whether or not significant enough to be included in this report, should be
corrected.
7. Reference (b) requires that the command endorse this report within 60 days
stating specific action taken or planned, along with anticipated completion dates
to correct the problem areas identified in enclosures (1) and (5). Comments must
be submitted for each recommendation provided. A copy of the endorsement should
be forwarded to this office.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - ADMINISTRATIVE EXAMINATION
I. SCOPE: The administrative examination was conducted in two parts, a
personnel service record examination and an internal control examination.
A. Internal Record Phase. This portion consisted of a review of a random
sample of the personnel records to detect errors caused by the administrative
section and unresolved errors for which the administrative section must initiate
corrective action. The sampling design was based upon past and anticipated
Marine Corps error trends with a desired sample precision of plus or minus 2.5
percent.
B. Internal Control Phase. This portion involved a comprehensive review of
internal control procedures and determinations if those procedures were in
compliance with Marine Corps directives. This phase consisted of a review of
service records (OQR/SRB); unit diaries (UD) ; unit transaction registers (UTR);
unit punishment books (UPB) ; pending transaction registers (PTR); correspondence
files; internal control systems; control logs; compliance with the Marine Corps
pay policy; promotion procedures; leave procedures; extensions/reenlistments, and
the effectiveness of the join and monthly LES audits.
C. Errors Defined:
1. Monetary Errors. Monetary errors are those that have resulted in an
actual overpayment -or underpayment to a Marine. When corrective action is taken
the Marine will likely see a change in pay. These errors comprise your command's
"official" error rate.
2. Advisory Errors. Advisory errors are errors which could cause
potential mispayments, reporting errors not yet affecting pay, and policy and
procedural violations. Potential values, where appropriate, are shown to
emphasize the significance of these errors.
II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.
A. Variable Housing Allowance (VHA). This category contributed 25 percent
of all monetary errors and eight percent of all advisory errors detected and
involved:
1. Starting the entitlement on a date other than the day of reporting.
2. Reporting an incorrect zip code
3. Not reporting or incorrectly reporting a termination of the
entitlement when the dependents join the Marine at
4. Not crediting VHA at the old permanent duty station location rate
from the date of marriage of the Marine until the day prior to the date of
reporting to
5. Failure to credit VHA at the old duty station rate when the Marine
dispossessed government quarters at the old duty station.
Encl (1)
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. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - ADMINISTRATIVE EXAMINATION (Cont)
These errors were caused by inattention to detail by the administrative personnel
and, in some cases, the inability of the clerks to recognize an error condition
in the entitlement to VHA. Since the conditions of entitlement to VHA differ
somewhat when the Marine is located
particular attention is needed to understand the instructions contained in the
JTR, Chapter 4, Part L. The clerks must be able to recognize that a change in
the VHA rate may be indicated when the Marine updates his Record of Emergency
Data (RED) with a new dependent location, or applies for Commuted Rations because
he resides with his family Additionally, the joining audit must
be thorough enough to detect prior periods of entitlement to VHA, such as a
Marine that marries enroute to These errors can cause
incorrect payments to Marines.
Recommendation #A-1. - That the personnel officers review their internal
controls to highlight those situations where an individual Marine notifies the
command of a change in the service record, and that change could effect VHA.
Also, the personnel chiefs should review the reference cited and thoroughly
instruct all administrative clerks on the varying conditions of entitlement to
VHA. This instruction should be a portion of the ongoing technical training for
administrative clerks.
B. Family Separation Allowance (FSA). This category contributed 23 percent
of all monetary errors detected and involved a variety of situations of
entitlement and non-entitlement to FSA. The reasons for these errors were due
primarily to inadequate research during the auditing process of the monthly LES
and a failure of supervisory personnel to detect the incorrect information during
the review of the unit diary. These problems further stem from the relative
inexperience administrators have in administering some pay and allowances. This
is true expecially for those entitlements that have been recently given to the
commanding officer for reporting, that were traditionally reported by the
disbursing officer. The inability to recognize periods of entitlement or non-
entitlement to FSA has resulted in Marines being mispaid. (Ref : DODPM, Part 3,
Chap 3; and PRIM, para 8052)
Recommendation #A-2. - That the personnel chiefs, as part of the continual
technical training program, instruct all clerks on the conditions of entitlement
to FSA. If additional assistance is needed, periods of instruction should be *
(coordinated with the local disbursing officer. Additionally, the personnel
officers should pay particular attention to FSA entries when reviewing the unit
diary for accuracy.
C. TAD Rations (DOPMA BAS). This entitlement was primarily responsible for
23 percent of all monetary errors detected in the Commuted Rations/Basic
Allowance for Subsistence category and mainly dealt with the drivers of
Battalion not being credited DOPMA BAS when they made trips- away from
Since Marines must subsist at their own
expense while TAD away from the permanent duty station, a failure to report the
credit, or reporting it incorrectly on the unit diary, causes incorrect payments
for those Marines not receiving a subsistence allowance at the permanent duty
station. (Ref: PRIM, para 8008 and Table 8-3)
Encl (1)
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Recommendation #A-3. ' That the personnel officer have the motor transport
chief provide him with a list of names, dates, and times, at least weekly (to
prevent late reporting) of all Marines performing duty away from
This roster would then be used to substantiate the unit diary.
D. Cumulative Career Sea Time. This item contributed 27 percent of all
advisory errors noted and involved a failure to report or incorrectly reporting
on the unit diary all periods of sea service for individual Marines. Unit diary
entries were not reported because of an oversight by supervisory personnel. A
failure to report or incorrectly reporting cumulative career sea service could
cause incorrect payments for Marines who serve aboard a naval vessel in the
future. (Ref: SECNAVINST 7220. 77B; and DODPM, Part 1, Chapter 7)
Recommendation #A-4 . • That personnel officers make sure join audit procedures
include screening the service records for possible periods of sea service. This
screening procedure should include an interview with the individual Marine to
identify all possible periods of sea service. Once all periods are identified
they should be reported on the unit diary as shown in the PRIM, paragraph 8010.5.
E. Unit Diary Reporting (Timeliness). A review of eight pay-related unit
diary entries, conducted within each unit, revealed a significant percentage of
entries being reported in excess of ten days after the action had occurred. This
deficiency was caused by slow document flow and poor managerial techniques within
the administrative offices. This results in late chackages and credits to the
master military pay account. (Ref: PRIM, par. 1401.2a)
Recommendation #A-5 ' That the personnel officers set up internal control
procedures to make sure that all reportable information is routed to the unit
diary section for input on a daily basis. There is no standardized procedure for
this, however, each unit must set up a system and strictly adhere to it. Super-
visors must be familiar with this system and conduct periodic checks to make sure
it is functioning properly.
F. Promotion Procedures. During a review of the unit diaries it was
discovered that numerous promotions were reported in excess of ten days after
the effective date of the promotion. This problem was caused by the following '
procedural deficiencies:
1. Training information necessary for computation of automated composite
scores was not being submitted to the unit diary in a timely manner. This
results in inaccurate or no composite scores being computed and consequently
Marines not being promoted when eligible.
2. Commands not screening records of eligible Marines in sufficient time
to allow for preparation and certification of warrants and timely delivery of
copies of warrants to the unit diary section for input. This delay resulted in
Marines not receiving increased pay and allowances in a timely manner.
Recommendation #A-6. That the personnel officers establish procedures that
provide for the screening of records of eligible Marines the month prior to the
month of eligibility. Once all eligible and recommended Marines are identified,
U0 Encl (1)
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warrants should then be prepared, certified, and routed to the unit diary section
for input on the first day of the month of promotional eligibility. We also
recommend that all required training data be compiled and reported on the unit




SUMMARY OF SRB PHASE
EXAMINATION SUMMARY
Service records available for examination
Number of records examined
Percent of command coverage




II. Monetary Error Summary . Monetary errors are those that have resulted in an actual
overpayment or underpayment to a Marine. When corrective action is taken the Marine will
likely see a change in pay. These errors comprise your command's "official" error rate.
Total number of monetary errors
Number of records which contained errors




Areas Number of Monetary errors
Variable Housing Allowance :
a. Entitled/not entitled
Family Separation Allowance :
a. Entitled/not entitled
ComRats/BAS :
a. ComRats not reported
b. ComRats retroative approval
Career Sea/Foreign Duty Pay :
a. Commencement/termination not/
incorrectly reported 8
Basic Allowance for Quarters :
a. Partial BAQ























$ 2419.66 $ 1576.21 $ 3,99!/
$ 603.03 $ 908.00 $ 1,5113
$- $ 171.93 $ 1713
$ 113.51 $ 1,043.82 $ 1,15/ 3
$ 113.51 $ 1,215.75 $ l,32Si






— $ 114.81 $ 114
$ 83.36 $ 8.r
$ 15.63 $ 20.84 $ 3j_
$ 15.63 $ 104.20 $ US
112
4 $ 7,144,54 $ 4,000.00 $11,1^-
2 $ 183.48 $ 2.89 $ 18f! :
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II. Monetary Error Summary (Cont)






Pay Entry Base Date :









a. RCMA incorrectly reported
Miscellaneous Administrative
Discrepancies :




1 $ 1.52 $-
1 $-
- $ 1.52
1 $ 236.86 $ $ 236.86
1 $ $ 33.54 $ 33.54
1 $ 358.00 $ $ 358.00
$ 2.40 $ 2.40
1 $ ' 229.50 $— $ 229.50
115 $11,358.51 $ 8,061.04 $19,419.55
[II. Advisory Error Summary . Advisory errors are errors which could cause potential mis-
sayments, reporting errors not yet affecting pay, and policy and procedural violations.
3otential values, where appropriate, are shown to emphasize that they may be as important,
jr more important, than actual monetary errors.
,
Total number of advisory errors
Number of records with advisory errors




Lreas Number of Advisory Errors
Over- Under- No Money Total
Payments Payments
Career Sea/Foreign Duty Pay :







•SUMMARY OF SRB PHASE (Cont)
III. Advisory Error Summary . (Cont)
Areas Number of Advisory Errors Potential Monetary Values
Over- Under- No Money Total Over- Under- Total
Payments Payments Payments Payments
Taxes :
a. State Code: SRB and
LES disagree 1 1 $ $ $
b. W-4 and LES disagree
_=_ _=_
11 11 $ $ $
12 12 $ $ $
Leave :
a. Not Re-reported - - 1 1 $ 382.08 $ $ 382.
b. Incorrectly reported - - $ 117.80 $ 74.46 $ 192.
c. Career LSL not/in-
correctly reported
_8_
_J_ _^ _9_ $ 3,397.10 $ 2,798.03 $ 6,195.
4 2 1 7 $ 3,896.98 $ 2,872,49 $ 6,769.
Pay Entry Base Date :
a. SRB and LES disagree 7 7 $ $ $
Variable Housing
Allowance :
a. Entitled/not entitled 5 5 $ $ $
Grade :
a. Incorrectly effected 1 - 3 4 $ 26.40 $ $ 26.
ComRats/BAS :
a. D0PMA BAS entitled/
not entitled 2 2 $ $ $
VEAP:
a. Elected participation
deduction 2 2 $ $ $-
Family Separation
Allowance :
a. Entitled/not entitled 1 1 $ $ $
Time Lost
a. Not reported - - $ 234.30 $ $
TOTAL ADVISORY ERRORS





























PROMOTION PROCEDURES/TIMELINESS X X X X X
EXTENSIONS
COURTS-MARTIAL: AUTOMATIC REDUCTIONS



















DOCUMENT FLOW/ CONTROL X
TIMELINESS X X X X X X X X








































COMMAND: ERROR %: 15.60%
116 End (4)
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS - DISBURSING EXAMINATION
I. SCOPE
:
The disbursing examination was also conducted in two parts, a
personal financial record examination and an internal control examination.
A. Personal Financial Record Phase. This portion of the examination was
conducted, in part, within the administrative office. Disbursing errors detected
during the SRB Phase of the examination were verified and charged as disbursing
errors when appropriate.
B. Internal Control Phase. This portion of the examination consisted of
reviewing PFR's; controls logs; correspondence files; internal control systems;
general security of funds; payment of public vouchers, and compliance with the
Marine Corps pay policy.
C. Errors Defined
1. Monetary Errors. Monetary errors are those that have resulted in an
actual overpayment or underpayment to a Marine. When corrective action is taken
the Marine will likely see a change in pay. These errors comprise your command's
"official" error rate.
2. Advisory Errors. Advisory errors are errors which could cause
potential mispayments, reporting errors not yet affecting pay, and policy and
procedureal violations. Potential values, where appropriate, are shown to
emphasize the significance of these errors.
II. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ; There were no significant disbursing
findings.
U7 Encl (5)
SUMMARY OF PFR PHASE
I. EXAMINATION SUMMARY
Service records available for examination
Number of records examined
Percent of command coverage





II. Monetary Error Summary . Monetary errors are those that have resulted in an actual
overpayment or underpayment to a Marine. When corrective action is taken the Marine will
likely see a change in pay. These errors comprise your command's "official" error rate.
Total number of monetary errors
Number of records which contained errors
































































TOTAL MONETARY ERRORS 17 29 46 $ 1,616.46 $ 3,931.97 $ 5,548.43
III. Advisory Error Summary . Advisory errors are errors which could cause potential mis-
payments, reporting errors not yet affecting pay, and policy and procedural violations.
Potential values, where appropriate, are shown to emphasize that they may be as important,
or more important, than actual monetary errors.
Total number of advisory errors
Number of records with advisory errors ;
Percentage of records with advisory errors .68%
118
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Areas Number of Advisory Errors
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
disbursing on-sitc examination tiam. wcst coast
M»»INt CORPS ItIC




From: Officer in Charge
To: Commandant of the Marine Corps, Headquarters, United States Marine
Corps, (Code FDD), Washington D. C 20380-0001











Summary of Active PFR Phase
Most Common Errors Detected - Active Disbursing Phase
Summary of Reserve PFR Phase
Most Common Errors Detected - Reserve Disbursing Phase
Summary of Active SRB Phase
Summary of Significant Internal Control Findings - Active
Most Common Errors Detected - Active Administrative Phase
Summary of Reserve SRB Phase
Summary of Significant Internal Control Findings - Reserve
Most Common Errors Detected - Reserve Administrative Phase
1. During fiscal year 1986, we examined 10,727 active duty records and
1,016 reserve records. Two percent of the active duty records contained
errors chargeable to the disbursing officer while no errors were charged tothe disbursing officer of reserve pay. Enclosures (1) through (4) furtherdetail the results of the disbursing phase of our examination.
2. Thirteen percent of the active duty records contained one or more errors
chargeable to the commanding officer, while five percent contained errors inthe reserve service record books. Enclosures (5) through (10) summarize the
errors detected and present the error trends discovered during the admini-
strative phase of our examination.
SUMMARY OF ACTIVE PFR PHASE
^i
I. EXAMINATION SUMMARY
Service records available for examination
Number of records examined
Percent of command coverage
Number of second notices issued
II. Monetary Error Summary
.
Total number of monetary errors
Number of records which contained errors













Disbursing Office Input :
a. Base Pay
b. BAQ


















































































































$ .96 $ ^955.05
$ 9.60 $/ 19.32





$ 150.58 %/ 1.90
$ $^~ 4.33




















SUMMARY OF ACTIVE PFR PHASE (Cont)
III. Advisory Error Summary .
Total number of advisory errors
Number of records with advisory errors
Percentage of records with advisory errors
55
/ 53( , .58%
Areas Number of Advisory Errors


























28 $ 1,044.01 $ 53.67 $ 1,097.6
3.98 3.9
$ 816.22 $ 926.39 $ 1 ,742.6
$ 9,452.92 $ 499.16 $ 9.952.C
$10,273.12 $ 1,425.55 $11,698.6
$ 1,320.00 $ $1,320.00




MOST COMMON ERRORS DETECTED - ACTIVE DISBURSING PHASE
L^T^percentTth.^' Categ°ry "»«"<"« » Percent of the
a. Basic Allowance for Subsistence.
b. Family Separation Allowance.
c. Variable Housing Allowance.




Chan8S °f Statlon/Te»por.ry Additional Duty Leave.
Errors in these categories were orimariH <-a„o a^ v
process/ These ffiSiTfiS^SS*
involved the following'a«L of'entnlenen?: * "*"' dete"ed and
a. Base Pay.
b. Basic Allowance for Subsistence.




SUMMARY OF ACTIVE SRB PHASE
I. EXAMINATION SUMMARY
Service records available for examination
Number of records examined
Percent of command coverage
Number of second notices issued
II. Monetary Error Sumn-.arv
Total number of monetary errors
Number of records which contained errors





















Fanilv Separation Allowance :
a. Entitled/not entitled




Variable Housing Allowance :
a. Entitled/not entitled
b. VHA offset not/incor-
rectly reported











































123 $ 5,105.29 $ 2,025.65 $ 1 % \\33 $ 422.95 $ 1,043.82 $ 1.46J
287 $ 7,442.29 $ 8,077.77 $15,52
.
7 $ 97.22 $ 109.84 $ 20
450 /$13,067.75 $11,257.08 $24732
/
431 ^$ 8,345.07 $11,574.40 $19,91
306
11
$ 659.31 $ 2,162.05 $ 2,82
$ / 43.24 $ $ k
317 $./ 702.55 $ 2,162.05 TT786
126 210 $15,660.80 $18,183.12 $33,84:1
$ 1>377.QQ $ 1,001.60 $ 2,37t :19
229 ^17,037.80 $19,184.72 $36,' 22:
32 $ 8.47 $ 286.98 $ 29!
50 $12,619.93 $ 2,527.55 $15,1471
62
_6_ $4,412.18 $ $ 4,41
88 ^$17,040.58 $ 2,814.53 $19,855
126
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tl. Monetary Error Summary
. (Cont)
Ireas
*av Entry Base Date :
i. SRB and LES disagree





utonated Per Diem (HDP) :
. Entitled/not entitled











Incorrectly reported >. 3
PCS/TAD orders not submitted 1
onus :
i. Entitled/not entitled \S21
t .othing Maintenance Allowance :
i Incorrect CMA date 3
1 RCMA not/incorrectly reported 1
fecial Duty Assignment/
j centive Pav :
2 Entitled/not entitled
Imminent danger pay






T .Tie Lost :
























Total Over- Under- Total
Payments Payments





792.59 $ 3,331.59 $ 4,124.18
$ .94 $ 1,161.42 $ 1,162.36
$ 642.20 $ 2,380.50 $ 3,022.70$^643.14 $ 3,541.92 $ 4,185.06





$ $ 332.8O $ 332.80
$ 18.13 $ 151.76 $ 169.89
S /111. 32 $ 3,364.08 $ 3,475.40
%/ 129.45 $ 3,848.64 $ 3,978.09




109.60 $ 366.23 $ 475.83
55.80 $ 1,041.74 $ 1,097.54
65.40- $ 1,407.97 $ 1,573.371
13 $ 1,133.33 $ 2,251.49 $ 3,384.82
_J_ $ $ 10.61 $ 10.61
14 %4, 133.33 $ 2,262.10 $ 3,395.43
4 $ 1,639.00 $ $ 1,639.00
_8_ $ / 1.00 $ 180.00 $ 181.00
12 5/1,640.00 $ 180.00 $ 1,820.00
9 $/ 695.66 $ 136.92 $ 832. 5S
9 $/ 764.29 $ ! 586.21 $ 1,350.50
127
End (5)
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II. Monetary Error Summary . (Cont)
Areas Number of Monetary errors Actual Monetary Values
TOTAL MONETARY ERRORS
III. Advisory Error Summary
Total number of advisory errors
,
Number of records with advisory errors


















Areas Number of Advisory Errors
Over- Under- No Monev Total
Payments Payments
9.82%











a. State Code: SRB and
LES disagree -

















Pay Entry Base Date :































36 $ $ $.
216 $ $ $.
252 $
9 $ 2,933.92 $ $ 2, 933.'
13 $ 1,052.85 $ 1,311.70 $ 2,364.1
10 $ 962.14 $ 70.58 $ 1,032.1
145 $54,746.37 $ 8,091.91 $62,838.:
12 "$14,972.96 $ $14, 972. (.
189 $74,668.24 $9,474.19 $84,142.'
139 $ 133.38 $ $ 133.:
128
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III. Advisory Error Summary (Cont)
Areas Nuir.ber of Advisory Errors





b. Incorrectly effected 3
3
Clothing Maintenance Allowance :






a. Entitled/not entitled -
b. VHA offset not/







Expiration of Current Contract :

























































$ $ 21.60 $ 21.60
$ 2.47 $ 57.60 $ 60,07
$ 2.47 $ " 79.20 '$ bl.67
$ $ 30.31 $ 30.31
$ $ 3~o73T $ 30.31
$— $—** ^——— —
$ 50.60 $ 4 50.60
$ 50.60 $ $ 50.60
$ 320.07 $ $ 320.07
129
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III. Advisory Error Summary (Cont)
Are3s Number of Advisory Errors Potential Monetar y Values







a. Not entitled $ 2.00 $ $
Basic Allowance for
Quarters :
a. Incorrectly reported 1 i $ < *_
NJP :
a. Erroneous punishments 1 _ j « § f. c '^ S. sQ
Bonus
a. Not entitled 1 - . 1 $ 1,121.39 $ $ 1,121
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MOST COMMON ERRORS DETECTED - ACTIVE ADMINISTRATION PHASE
1. Basic Allowance for Subsistence (BAS) . This category contributed 24
percent of all monetary errors and involved:
a. Reporting temporary additional duty (TAD) rations for Marines who
participated in an exercise on field duty orders.
b. Not or incorrectly reporting checkages of subsistence for Marines
involved in field duty maneuvers or operations.
c. TAD rations not or incorrectly reported on the unit diary for
enlisted personnel performing periods of TAD away from the permanent duty
station.
d. Incorrect reporting of commuted rations on the unit diary.
e. Not or incorrectly reporting TAD rations for emergency Jcavc iw
Marines stationed overseas, returning to CONUS.
These errors were caused by a lack of understanding of the regulations regard-
ing subsistence, poor document flow of TAD orders, and inaccurate reviewing of
the unit diary by supervisory personnel. These findings resulted in both
overpayments and underpayments to individual Marines. (Ref: PRIM, par 8008
and Table 8-3; MCO- 10110. 33B; and DODPM, Part 3, Chap 1)
2. Family Separation Allowance (FSA) . This category contributed 23 percent
of all monetary errors detected and involved a variety of situations of
entitlement and non-entitlement to FSA. The reasons for these errors were
due primarily to inadequate research during the auditing process of the LES
and a failure of supervisory personnel to detect the incorrect information
during the review of the unit diary. These problems further stem from the
relative inexperience administrators have in administering some pay and
allowances. This is true especially for those entitlements that have been
recently given to the commanding officer for reporting, that were tradition-
ally reported by the disbursing officer. The inability to recognize periods
of entitlement or nonentitlement to FSA has resulted in Marines being incor-
rectly paid. (Ref: DODPM, Part 3, Chap 3; and PRIM, par 8052)
3. Career Sea/Foreign Duty Pav . This category contributed 17 percent of
the monetary errors detected and 34 percent of the advisory errors detected
and involved:
a. Commencement of career sea pay or foreign duty pay not reported, or
incorrectly reported on the unit diary.
b. Termination of career sea pay or foreign duty pay not reported, or
incorrectly reported on the unit diary.




MOST COMMON ERRORS DETECTED - ACTIVE ADMINISTRATION PHASE (Cont)
The cause of these errors was primarily due to unfamiliarity with the regu-
lations contained in the Department of Defense Pay Manual (DODPM), Part 1,
Chapters 6 and 7, which govern the conditions of entitlement to these types
of special pay. In many cases inadequate research of. the appropriate pay
regulation directly caused incorrect unit diary reporting of commencement
and termination dates of the special pay. In a few cases, administrative
oversight was the root cause for the errors. The failure to correctly
report commencement or termination dates of the special pay causes incorrect
payments to Marines who participate in operations in Korea, the Republic of
the Philippines, or Thailand. Additionally, the failure to report all prior
periods of career sea service as shown in the PRIM, paragraph 8010.5, can
result in a Marine receiving career sea pay at the wrong rate.
A. Variable Housing Allowance (VHA) . This item contributed 12 percent of
the monetary errors detected and involved:
a. Failure to credit VHA at the old duty station rate when the Marine
acquired a new dependent enroute to the new permanent duty station. When a
Marine acquires a new dependent enroute to a new duty station, entitlement
to VHA at the old duty station rate (if a Marine is transferred from a CONUS
station to a CONUS station) commences on the date of BAQ entitlement, and
continues through the day prior to the date of reporting to the new perma-
nent duty station
._
This resulted in underpayments to the Marines otherwise
entitled.
b. Failure to credit VHA at the old duty station rate when the Marine
dispossessed government quarters. Upon dispossession of the government
quarters, VHA at the old duty station rate should have been reported, by the
previous command, effective on the date of dispossession of quarters. The
failure of the old command to report this entitlement can be detected
through the join audit by locating the quarters dispossession document and
ensuring that the previous command annotated the UD number and effective
date of the stop quarters (indicating action was taken by prior command) and
monitoring the next LES to make sure that all entitlements have posted.
This resulted in underpayments to the Marines otherwise entitled.
c. Failure to commence entitlement on the correct date when a Marine
becomes entitled to BAQ or joins the new permanent duty station. The
failure to report the correct BAQ effective date resulted in reporting of
the wrong VHA effective date. The failure to report the correct join date
resulted in the automatic change to VHA entitlement on the wrong effective
date. This resulted in underpayments and overpayments to the Marines
involved.
d. Failure to stop VHA for Marines living in the barracks who are
receiving basic allowance for quarters at the with dependents rate solely
because of child support.
e. Failure to report or correctly report data associated with VHA
offset information. Incorrect or missing information results in inaccurate
computations and improper payments.
Encl (7)
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The cause of these errors can be attributed to administrative personnel not
being aware of the correct action to be taken in these specific cases.
(Ref: PRIM, par 8116 and Table 8-37; and JTR, Chap 4, Part L)
5. Taxes . This category contributed 21 percent of the advisory errors
noted during the SRB phase of the examination. In some cases the state code
on the current LES did not agree with the legal residence shown on the DD
Form 2058, and in others the federal tax plan did not agree with the tax
plans shown on the IRS Form W-4. These errors were caused by poor document
flow from the SRB section to the unit diary section. The effects of these
errors are that Marines are paid incorrectly since their chosen tax plans
were not implemented, and that wages are reported to the wrong state. (Ref:
PRIM, par 8047)
6. Leave . This category contributed 16 percent of the advisory errors
and two percent of the monetary errors noted and involved:
a. Periods o'f leave not reported or re-reported on the unit diary.
b. Periods of leave incorrectly reported on the unit diary.
c. Erroneous leave balances.
d. Incorrect lump sun; leave records.
e. Permanent Change of Station (PCS) and Temporary Additional Duty
(TAD) periods involving delay not submitted to the disbursing officer for
liquidation.
These errors were caused by a lack of knowledge by the SRB clerks, as well
as oversight in some cases. The same is true for PCS orders not submitted,
except in some cases inadequate internal control systems were the root cause
for the failure to submit PCS claims in a timely manner. An inaccurate
leave account can result in potential overpayments or underpayments when a
Marine is afforded the opportunity to settle unpaid lump sum leave. Although
these errors have not yet caused actual mispayments, their combined poten-
tial value is $84,142.43. (Ref: RLLAA; PRIM, par 8069; JFPM, par 90106;
and MCTIM, par 40301)
7. Pav Entry Base Date (PE3D) . This item contributed 12 percent of all
advisory errors and three percent of all monetary errors noted and involved
the miscomputation of the PEBD based on the documentation in the SRB. These
errors were caused by a lack of knowledge and the inability to recompute
PEBD's by administrative personnel. Wrong PEBD's result in incorrect pay-
ments based on the number of years service for which the Marine is being
paid. (Ref: DODPM, Part 1, Chap 1; and PRIM, par 8085)
8. Dependency Certification . Our examinations revealed that 37 percent of
the maintenance errors detected were discovered in this category. Depen-
dency certifications on the anniversary visual audit sheet were not com-
pleted in some cases and in others were improperly completed. These errors
were caused by units "not establishing effective controls to ensure comple-
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tion of the certification. The dependency certification supports the con-
tinual existence of dependents and provides- assurance that changes in depen-
dency will not go undetected. (Ref: PRIM, par 11007)
9. Unit Diary Reporting Timeliness . A review of nine pay-related unit
diary entries, conducted within each unit, revealed a significant percentage
of entries being reported in excess of ten days after the action had occurred.
This deficiency was caused by slow document flow and poor managerial tech-
niques within the administrative office. This results in late checkages and
credits to the master military pay account. (Ref: PRIM, par 1401.2a)
10. Promotion Procedures . During a review of the unit diaries it was dis-
covered that numerous promotions were reported in excess of ten days after
the effective date of the promotion. This problem was caused by the fol-
lowing procedural deficiencies:
a. Training information necessary for computation of automated com-
posite scores was not being submitted on the unit diary in a timely manner.
This results in inaccurate or no composite scores being computed and con-
sequently Marines not being promoted when eligible.
b. Commands were not screening records of eligible Marines in suf-
ficient time to allow for preparation and certification of warrants and
timely delivery of copies of warrants to the unit diary section for input.
This delay resulted in Marines not receiving increased pay and allowances in
a timely manner.
11. Travel Controls . Commanding officers are not making sure that all TAD
claims are submitted to the disbursing officer within three working days
after the Marine returns from TAD. This problem is caused by inadequate
tracking procedures, operational commitments, and a lack of knowledge by
supervisory personnel regarding travel regulations. As a result, travel
advances cannot be liquidated by the disbursing officer and accountability
of funds by the Funding Authority/Order Issuing Activity cannot be
reconciled. (Ref: MCTIM, par 40301. 2e)
12. Order Issuing . During our review of TAD orders we found the following
deficiencies:
a. Orders did not in all cases direct a mode of transportation.
b. Orders directing the use of commercial transportation did not in all
cases indicate that such transportation should be provided by government
transportation request (GTR).
c. Orders did not require travelers to obtain certificates as to the
availability of government quarters and messing.
The failure to adequately review the ACTS Manual when preparing orders was
the cause of this finding. Administrative personnel were not fully aware of
the effect of orders on travel entitlements. We did not discover any waste
or abuse as a result of these omissions but the command could incur
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additional expenses if the traveler did not comply with the unwritten intent
of the orders. Additionally, these omissions result in disbursing officers
not being able to accurately determine travel entitlements. (Ref: ACTS
Manual, par 4204 and 4205)
13. DOPMA BAS (Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) Rations) . DOPMA BAS was not
or incorrectly reported for all enlisted personnel performing periods of TAD
away from the permanent duty station. This deficiency was caused by super- •
visory personnel not having adequate internal control procedures to ensure
copies of all TAD orders are routed to the unit diary section for input of
appropriate unit diary entries. These errors result in underpayments for
Marines not receiving a subsistence allowance at their permanent duty station,
(Ref: PRIM, par 8008 and Table 8-3)
14. Government Transportation Requests (GTR's) . GTR's.were not inventoried
monthly by the responsible officers nor did the issuing officers endorso H-.
member's original orders to show date of issue, points of origin, and de^
tination, and complete routing for the trip. Failing to comply with the
regulations increases the potential for loss or misuse of GTR's and con-
seauently government funds. (Ref: UM 4400.15, par 03000. 4H and MCO
P4600.14A, par 309021)
15. Invoice Processing Procedures . During our review of the commands' bill
paying procedures we discovered the following deficiencies:
a. Defective invoices were not being returned to the vendor in writing,
specific as to the reason for return, and the nature of required corrective
action.
b. Vouchers were not properly marked to identify discounts.
These deficiencies were a result of supply personnel not being familiar with
regulations concerning the processing of bills. This can result in due
dates being miscomputed, the loss of discounts, and the potential for
interest payments. (Ref: NavComptMan, Vol 4, Chap 6)
16. Imprest Fund . Our review of the imprest fund revealed that purchase
request documents retained to support the authenticity of the purchase did
not contain the name and address of the vendor. The imprest fund cashiers
did not know that this information was required to be on the purchase
request. Without accurate data the purchase cannot be verified as proper.
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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS FOR EAST AND WEST COAST MARINE CORPS
DISBURSING ON-SITE EXAMINATION TEAMS (MCDOSET' S) FOR FIS-
CAL YEAR 1986
Ref: (a) CMC ltr FDD-rgs 7220 of 4 May 1981
Encl : (1) Statistics for Active Duty SR3 Phase
(2) Statistics for Active Duty PER Phase
(3) Statistics for Reserve SRB Phase
(4) Comparative Analysis for Fiscal Years 1983-1986
. 1. The enclosures summarize select MCDOSET East and West Coast
statistics, per the reference.
2. Enclosure (1) lists the number and actual dollar value for
monetary errors detected thru MCDOSET active duty administrative
examination for Fiscal Year 1986. Significant findings include
the following:
a. Over 69 percent of the errors resulting' in overpayments
were attributed to FSA (29.5%), Com Rats/BAS (25.3%) and VHA
(14.6%). Bonuses accounted for over 36 percent ($14,869) of the
overpaid dollars. Other significant contributors to total over-
paid dollars were BAQ (19% or $38,811); VHA (12.8% or $26,107)
and Com Rats/BAS (12.2% or $24,866).
b. The primary reasons for underpayment errors were FSA
(19.8%), Com Rats/BAS (17.9%), and VHA (15.8%). Bonuses accounted
for over 23 percent ($38,467) of the total underpaid dollars.
Other substantial categories include VHA (17.6% or %28,796) , Com
Rats/BAS (13.6% or $22,297), and FSA (11.9% or $19,514).
c. Error categories were ranked, with respect to volume and
dollar value of overpayment and underpayment error categories,
for each team and tested for significance of correlation. Results
indicated significant correlations between team results for all
comparisons (Volume of overpayments: rs = .64, Z = 2.50, p < .05,
overpayment dollar value: rs = .85, t = 8.21, p < .01, volume of
underpayments: rs = .66, Z = 2.56, p < .05, and underpayment
dollar value: rs .77, t = 6.08, p < .01). Therefore, volume
and dollar value of types of errors detected in the active duty
administrative phase for both teams were quite similar when
ranked from highest to lowest category.
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3. Enclosure (2) lists similar statistics for the act~ive"duty
disbursing phase of MCDOSET FY 86 reviews. Disbursing" office"
input errors accounted for over 74 percent of the overpayment
errors (83% of overpayment dollars) and 79 percent of the under-
payment errors (62.6% of underpayment dollars). Significant
contributors to overpayment errors were VHA (44.8%) and BAQ
(18.3%). Primary categories of underpayment errors were PCS/TAD
Leave (34.6%) and VHA (31.3%). The predominant reason for
overpaid dollars was Bonuses (69.2% or $28,637). PCS/TAD Leave
errors accounted for over 47 percent ($9,785) of the underpaid
dollars
.
4. Enclosure (3) summarizes errors detected during the reserve
administrative phase. Errors attributed to Grade (33.7%), Drills
(24.6%), and Active Duty for Training (12.3%) contributed to the
majority of overpayment errors. Bonuses accounted for over 40
percent ($7,014) of the overpaid dollars. Errors resulting from
Active Duty for Training accounted for over 44 percent of the
underpayment errors and over 36 percent of the underpaid dollars.
5. Enclosure (4) provides a summary of MCDOSET error rates for
administrative, disbursing, and reserve components for Fiscal
Years 1983 thru 1986. Although there appears to be a decreasing
trend in the percentage of records with errors among all phases
over the past four fiscal years, one must be aware of various
changes over this period in the way errors are determined by the
Teams. For example, if all records with errors had been included
in FY 86 "official" error rates rather than only actual monetary
errors, the error rates would have increased in all cases (Admin-
istrative: 12.72% to 22.04%, Disbursing: 2.99% to 4.01%,
Reserve: 10.36% to 26.30%.).
6. Several common problem areas appear in various phases of
MCDOSET examination results. Errors attributed to VHA contri-
bute substantially to the number of overpayments and underpay-
ments in the active duty administrative and disbursing phases.
Bonus errors account for a significant portion of the dollar
value of mispayments in active duty and reserve examination
phases.
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Encl: (1) Overall Program Results
(2) Reports to Commanding Generals
Commanding Officers
1. Enclosure (1) provides an overall suns
of disbursing performance standards resul
for the second semiannual period of Fisca
Year 1986.
2. Enclosure (2) is comprised of individi
reports to Commanding Generals and Commann;
Officers.
3. Refer questions or comments pertaining




Analysis of Separated Marines* PFR's (Apr - Sep 86)
1. Four (20%) disbursing offices attained the 98 percent
accuracy rate goal. This compares with 8 (40%) disbursing
offices attaining the goal in the last report.
2. The Marine Corps accuracy rate decreased from 96.98 percent
in the last report to 96.31 percent in the current report.
3. There were over $126,420 in overpayments during this
reporting period. Twenty-three percent ($29,696.58) of these
overpayments were due to payment errors. Another 15 percent
($19,257.81) were due to allotment discrepancies. There were
over $113,840 in underpayments during this reporting period.
Fifty percent ($56,510.20) resulted from bonus errors.
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MARINE CORPS DISBURSING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
(2nd Semiannual FY86)
ANALYSIS OF SEPARATED MARINES PFR'S - PERCENTAGE OF PFR REJECTS
(APRIL THRU SEPTEMBER 1986)
PERCENTAGE SEP PFR ACCURACY RATE ACCPT ACCUR
DSSN PFR REJECTS ACTUAL ROUNDED, RATES2
3.90 96.10 96.00


















• 3.99 96.01 96.00
2.65 97.35 97.00
1.78 98.22 98.00 *
1.64 98.36 98.00 *
3.44 96.56 97.00
MC AVG 3.69 96.31 Accpt = 4 (20%)
DSSN AVG 3.38 Unaccpt = 16 (80%)
SD 1.59
cv .47




Represents Sep. PFR Accuracy Rate (Actual) rounded to the
nearest whole percentage point with criteria' of .50% justifying
rounding to the next highest percentage point.
Asterisk, denotes DSSN's who attained. or exceeded the established
FY86 Marine Corps Accuracy Rate Goal of 98%.
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SELECTED GROUP COMPARISON - SEPARATED PFR ACCURACY PERCENTAGE
2nd FY86 (APRIL 1986 - SEPTEMBER 1986)




GROUP 5 (AIR STATIONS)
TOTAL







































Denotes disbursing stations and/or selected groups
that attained or exceeded Marine Corps Accuracy



















































(February & April 1986)
1. All disbursing offices attained the 96 percent accuracy rate
goal for this reporting period. Twenty-two offices attained the
95 percent accuracy rate goal for the last reporting period
(July & December 1985)
.
2. The Marine Corps accuracy rate increased from 98.12 (July &
December 1985) to 98.28 percent (February & April 1986).
3. Nearly 85 percent of the monetary errors resulted in potential
overpayments of over $27,600. Seventy-seven percent of the over-
payment errors and 98 percent of the overpayment dollars ($27,140)
were attributable to elapsed time.
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RESULTS OF MARINE CORPS DISBURSING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
(2nd SEMIANNUAL - FY86)
MMPA AUDIT ANALYSIS (FEBRUARY & APRIL 1986)
Est. Avg. Est. Avg. Univ Accur
Univ. Error Rate (%) Accept Accur.






5153 0.00 100.00 100.00 A
5159 .66 99.34 99.00 L
5190 .67 99.33 99.00 L
5199 .72 99.28 99.00
5755 2.61
1 97.39 97.00 D
6091 1.99 98.01 98.00 S
6092 1.99 98.01 98.00 S
6096 1.33 98.67 99.00 N
6105 2.00 98.00 98.00 i
6107 .62 99.38 99.00 S
6109 .66 99.34 99.00
6154 1.97 98.03 98.00 A
6160 2.66 97.34 97.00 C
6167 2.00 98.00 98.00 C
6168 .^65 99.35 99.00 E
6187 2.67 97.33 97.00 P
6198 4.00 96.00 96.00 T
6795 1.33 98.67 99.00 A
6796 .67 99.33 99.00 B
6798 0.00 100.00 100.00 L
6805 2.00 98.00 98.00 E
6816 .67 99.33 99.00




Represents Est Avg Univ Accur Rate (Actual)
rounded to the nearest whole percentage with
criteria of .50% or greater justifying rounding
to the. next highest whole percentage point.
1
All of the DSSN's noted attained or exceeded the
Marine Corps Accuracy Rate Goal of 96%.
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MMPA AUDIT ANALYSIS - (FEBRUARY & APRIL 1986)




6092 98.01 6096 98.67





TOTAL 97.73 6795 98.67
6796 99.33
GROUP 2 (MC BASES) TOTAL 98.72
5190 99.33
















GROUP 4 (LOGISTICS) 6167 98.00
5159 99.34 TOTAL 98.10
5199 99.28
TOTAL 99.32
All disbursing stations and/or selected groups attained or exceeded

















































































































MCDOSET Disbursing Phase Examinations (FY86)
1. Nineteen (83%) disbursing offices attained the 96 percent
accuracy rate goal for Fiscal Year 1986. This compares to Fiscal
Year 1985, when 21 (91%) disbursing offices attained the accuracy
rate goal of 94 percent.
2. The Marine Corps average accuracy rate increased from 96.33
in FY85 to 97.04 in FY86.
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MARINE CORPS DISBURSING PERFORMANCE STANDARDS
(2nd Semiannual - FY86)
MCDOSET DISBURSING PHASE EXAMINATIONS - FY86
Sample Accuracy Rate (%) Accpt.
DSSN Error Actual Rounded, Accur Rate (%)
Rate (%)
4.305136 95.70 96.00 *
5153 4.58 95.42 95.00
5159 4.19 95.81 96.00 *
5190 3.68 96.32 96.00 *
5199 0.00 100.00 100.00 *
5755 1.12 98.88 99.00 *
6091 2.14 97.86 98.00 *
6092 2.81 97.19 97.00 •
6096 1.14 98.86 99.00 *
6105 4.89 95.11 95.00
6107 0.59 99.41 99.00 *
6109 0.00 100.00 100.00 *
6154 4.33 95.67 96.00 *
6160 3.03 96.97 97.00 *
6167 4.60 95.40 95.00
6168 0.26 99.74 100.00 *
6187 1.87- 98.13 98.00 *
6198 6.56 93.44 93.00
6795 1.12 98.88 99.00 *
6796 0.73 99.27 99.00 *
6798 0.89 99.11 99.00 *
6805 1.75 98.25 98.00 *
6816 3.55 96.45 96.00 *
MC AVG 2.96% 97.04% 97.00%
DSSN AVG 2.53% 97.47% 97.00% Accpt: 19 (83%)
SD 1.87 Unaccpt: 4 (17%)
CV .74
Actual accuracy percentage rounded to the nearest whole
percentage point with criteria of .50% or greater justifying
rounding to the next higher percentage point.
^Denotes disbursing stations and/or selected groups that
attained or exceeded Marine Corps Accuracy Goal (FY86) of 96%.
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SELECTED GROUP COMPARISON (FY86)
MCDOSET DISBURSING PHASE EXAMINATIONS










GROUP 3 (RECRUIT -DEPOTS)
*6798 99.11%

























Denotes disbursing stations and/or selected groups that
attained or exceeded Marine Corps Accuracy Goal (FY86) of 96%
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ANALYSIS OF REJECTS AND ERRORS ON PERSONAL
FINANCIAL RECORDS (PFR'S) FOR MARINES SEPARATED
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(1) Analysis of Errors among separated
PFR's by DSSN
(2) Reasons for Errors among separated
PFR's
(3) Graph of Accuracy Percentage for %
separated PFR's by DSSN
(4) Cumulative summary graph of
separated PFR Accuracy Percentage
The enclosures provide a consolidated
(
summary from a review of separated member s
PFR's during the month of June 1987.
ng to this
Statistics2.
Questions or comments pertaird
report should be addressed to the
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Reasons for Errors Among Separated Member's PFR's
1. Payments
a. Hand posted to LES but not deducted
b. Duplicate checkage
c. Erroneous checkage
d. Unauthorized payment following fraud determination
e. Forecasted payment not charged, yet paid and posted to
subsequent LES
2. Allotments
a. Not deducted for month of release/discharge
b. Erroneous deduction for,month of release/discharge
c. Prorated deduction
d. Failure to submit ABA or messages when required











c. Credited but not considered in leave balance
d. Duplicate credit







a. Erroneous Pay Grade (Promoted/Reduced)
b. Erroneous Pay Rate (PE3D)
c. Over/credit checkage (i.e., credit of basic pay differs










21. Adv . pay
22. VEAP
23. TVL/Trans
24. C & SS
25. Clothing ckgs.
26. Miscomputation-m lematical errors on discharge account
summary sheet
27. -Miscellaneous
a. Uon deduction of balance for liquidation of indebtedness
b. Erroneous credi t/checkage for VHA »*
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Encl: (1) Analysis of errors by DSSN
(2) Reasons for overpayments and
underpayments
(3) Graph of estimated average universe
accuracy rate
(4). Reasons for advisory errors
(5) Reasons for administrative monetary
errors
1. This report summarizes results from the
Quality Monitoring Branch's (QAM) examination
of pay accounts, randomly selected from the
months of August and December 1986.
2. Highlights from these reviews follow:
a. Estimates indicate that less than
three percent (2.62%) of the active duty pay
accounts in the master file contain potential
monetary discrepancies. This compares with
an error rate of less than two percent (1.511
on the last semiannual report.
b. Over 75 percent of the monetary
(disbursing) discrepancies resulted in over-
payments. Elapsed time was the primary
contributor to overpayment errors, accounting
for nearly 83 percent of the errors and nearl
all (99.62%) of the potential overpayment
dollar value.
3. Refer any question or comments concerning
this report to the Directorate for Management
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Commandant of the Marine Corps (FDF)
ANALYSIS OF REENLISTMENT VOUCHERS (AUGUST 1987)
CMC ltr 7220 FDD-url-10 of Apr 85
(1) Analysis of errors by source and DSSN
(2) Reasons for SRB errors
(3) Reasons for excess leave errors
(4) Reasons for leave balance and LSL errors
(5) Reasons for advisory errors
(6) Reenlistraent bonus error codes
1. Enclosures (1) through (5) respond to the reference and
summarize results from our examination of sampled reenlistment
vouchers for August 1987.
2. The overall estimated disbursing office monetary accuracy
rate for August- is 99 percent. This month's command accuracy rate
is 83 percent. The majority (92%) of sample reenlistment voucher
errors are advisory in nature.
3. Ninety-six percent ($3,528.40) of all sample overpayments in
August ($3,661.11) are due to disbursing office errors. Eighty-
three percent ($3,038.05) of August's sample overpayment amount
results from Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) discrepancies.
Eighty-three percent ($2,527.30) of this month's sample SRB
disbursing errors are due to miscomputations involving erroneous
years and months of obligated service. Based on sample
statistics, we estimate the total overpayment value of all
reenlistment vouchers in August to be approximately $7,700.
4. All of August's sample underpayment total ($513.77) is due to
disbursing SRB errors. Eighty-one percent ($414.77) of this
amount is due to one SRB Base Pay error involving erroneous rank.
Based on sample statistics, we estimate the total underpayment
value for all reenlistment vouchers in August to be approximately
$1,000.
5. Eight percent of August's sample advisory discrepancies involve
disbursing errors. About sixty-two percent of these errors result
from using incorrect numbers of years for installment plans.
Ninety-two percent of August's sample advisory discrepancies involve
administrative errors. Thirty-six percent of administrative errors
involve incorrect expirations of current contracts (ECC's).
190
Sub j : ANALYSIS OF REENLISTMENT VOUCHERS (AUGUST 1987)
6. Enclosure (6) lists codes used for classifying errors in
enclosures (2) through (5)
.
7. Refer questions or comments concerning this report to the
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REENLISTMENT BONUS ERROR CODES
SRB ERRORS - DISBURSING - MONETARY
A. Miscomputation
1. Erroneous Multiples
2. Paid more than 16 years service (Zone C)
3. Erroneous years and months obligated service
B. Base Pay Errors
1. Erroneous PEBD
2. Erroneous Rank
3. Paid BP at reenl istment date vs discharge date
4. Pay raise not considered - (Normally January reenlistment)
C. Non-Entitlement
1. Per MCO applicable at reenlistment date
2. MOS not entitled
3. ALMAR used not applicable
D. Miscellaneous
1. Transposed dollar amount from 11060 endorsement to MMPA
2. All other
ERRORS IN LEAVE ACCOUNTING
E. Excess Leave
1. D.O. failed to check
2. D.O. erroneously checking for excess leave
*3. ECC not updated causes erroneous checkage
**4. Leave reported late and not checked
5. Non-accrual not considered or erroneous
6. All entitlements not properly checked
7. All other
F. Leave Balance Update
*1. Dropped to zero on discharge
*2. LSL not deducted from leave account after paid
3. All other
G. LSL Errors
1. LSL paid on C of G discharge
*2. Paid in excess of 60 days career LSL
**3. Paid more leave than had accrued
*4. Erroneous BP (PE3D, Rank, Pay Raises, etc.)






1. Incorrect number of years used for installment plans
2. SRB failed to post to MMPA
3. Anniversary/reenlistment date incorrect on MMPA
4. All other
•
I. Administrative Errors _
1. Incorrect Expiration of Current Contract (ECC)
2. Incorrect Pay Entry Base Date (PEBD)
3. PMOS incorrect in MMPA
4. All other
(*) Errors attributed to CO
(**) Errors attributed to CO and DO (JFPM 10301.4)
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To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (FDF) , Headquarters
U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, DC 20380-0001
Subj: JULY 1967 OVERPAYMENTS PROCESSED BY SEPARATIONS BRANCH
(1) July 1987 Changes/Additions to Post Audit Definitive
Coding for Overpayments and Payments After Discharge
(2) Listing of Overpayments to According to Category of
Overpayment
(3) Effect of Discharges Be-fore ECC (Early Outs) on Total
Overpayments
(4) Breakdown of Records Received and Overpaid Amount by DSSN
(5) DSSN Summary of Total Overpaid, Early Outs, and Received
as Overpaid
(6) Comparison of Overpayments Identified by DO to All
Overpayments
(7) Records Forwarded Without Discharge Drop Entries
1. This report identifies primary overpayments at discharge to include
the leading reasons of overpayments, the common conditions leading to
overpayment ,. and the major sources of overpayments. The root of this
report is assigned codes from the Post Audit Definitive Coding for
Overpayments and Payments After Separation. Enclosure (1) is included for
pen changes to existing codes. The enclosure that records the total count
and amount for each existing code for July 1987 report period will be
provided in the August 1987 report along with totals and count for the
current August statistics.
2. Statistics for the period of Oct 1985 through Jul 1987 have confirmed
5 leading reasons of overpayments
—
payments, allotments, excess leave,
bonus recoupments, and advance pay. These reasons attribute a constant
677. or 4518 occurrences and 827. or $3,528,167 of the FY 87 YTD overpaid
amount as indicated in Enclosure (2). The same 5 reasons for overpayment
are highlighted for the last 10 months in Enclosure (3). "Early Outs"
affect 70.97. of occurrences and 86.17. of the overpaid amount for the July
1987 report'period.
3. Enclosure (4) provides the count and. percentage of total records
received in FY 87 YTD. Sixteen (16) DSSN's represent 98.57. of records
received and 96.27. of the overpaid amount. Column 1 shows the ratio of
records received to FY 87 YTD overpayments amount by DSSN. The fluctuating
timeframe of processing records prevents the correlation of records
received monthly to overpayments processed monthly.
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"4. S'eventy percent of all overpayments are received from 6 DSSN'S —
DSSN's 5136, 5190, 6092, 6167, 6187, and 6796. Enclosure (5) displays
statistics showing the 6 DSSN's cover approximately 707. of:
- total count and overpaid amount
- early discharge overpayments that evade system edits at normal
ECC
- cases received as overpaid (overpayments identified by DO)
,
the master key to debt reduction
5. Enclosure (6) indicates the disbursing offices identified 53.6'/. of
occurrences and 67.67. of overpaid amount for all records processed. The
awareness at field level of overpayment potential prior to final
settlement stymies any continual rise in separation overpayments.
6. Enclosure (7) lists cases requiring discharge drop action by MCFC for
the report month. Thirty six (36) records were received from 13 DSSN's
without discharge drop action. The monthly average for this calendar year
is 477. lower (61 cases) than the average of 115 cases per month for the
period Jan 1985 through Dec 1986. This downward trend for this calendar
year exemplifies results of this report — a tool for both disbursing and


















7. July 1987 reports for individual DSSN's include an Enclosure (3),
Overpayments for DSSN ???? for July 1987. This enclosure lists the
assigned code for reason of overpayment with added indicator of
controllable area, either disbursing, administrative, or policy/
procedures. Preliminary indications are that policy/procedures are
predominant factors in overpayments at separation. Continued monitoring
of those factors could well provide sufficient statistical documentation
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ENCLOSURE (4
EFFECT OF DISCHARGES PRIOR TO ECC (EARLYOUT)
ON TOTAL OVERPAYMENTS
ALL ALLOVERPAID EARLYOUT OVERPAID FAR! vni it cadi vm .tCOUNT COUNT EARLYOUT X ^ES" ^aST AM^UNT^
FOR ALL OVERPAID RECORDS
JCT 86 837 51? 62=0"/. $432,446.16 $298,242.82
!OV 86 738 457 61.97. $435,849.48 $301,402.24
)EC 86 749 478 63.87. $501,084.62 $365,040.06
'AN 87 654 442 67.67. $429,127.21 $327,427.37
rEB 87 722 510 70.67. $422,286.92 $320,211.81
1AR 87 460 304 66.17. $343,525.47 $255,614.57
*PR 87 627 418 66.77. $614,618.84 $442,002=98
1AY 87 427 303 71.07. $394,016.66 $308,379.22
IUN 87 359 276 76=97. $329,527.75 $281,329.31
rUL 87 388 275 70.97. $399,132.11 $343,659.10























272 162 59.67. $105,968.78 $60,232.29 56.87.
255 139 54*57. $113,645.93 $60,205.21 53.07.
226 131 58.07. $107,049.81 $62,422.98 58.37.
215 126 58.67. $106,506.65 $57,822.83 54.37.
242 151 62.47. $121,352.40 $69,910.85 57.67.
218 136 62.47. $101,752.66 $58,838.74 57.87.
264 153 58.07. $149,928.88 $74,511.78 49.77.
178 115 64.67. $97,122.89 ' $56,347.40 58.07.
127 86 67.77. $55,290.89 $36,711.73 66.47.
142 88 62.07. $77,510.09 $47,349.83 61.17.
FOR OVERPAYMENTS CAUSED BY ALLOTMENTS
JCT 86 97 45 46.47. $26,696.66 $10,475.34 39.27.
JOV 86 86 42 48.87. $24,929.22 $11,475.41 46.07.
)EC 86 78 40 51.37. $23,284.19 $13,765.46 59.17.
fAN 87 66 42 63.67. $20,365.57 $12,186.19 59.87.
:EB 87 66 44 66.77. $18,258.69 $12,178.82 66.77.
1AR 87 46 29 63.07. $13,251.10 $7,039.17 53.17.
*PR 87 63 42 66.77. $19,213.41 $12,175.00 63.47.
1AY 87 42 - 27 64.37. $13,773.49 $9,602.39 69.77.
TUN 87 34 23 67.67. $14,292.94 $8,837.71 61.87.
rUL 87 42 30 71.47. $29,876.90 $14,064.61 47.17.
BTCIOSBRE (3)
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FOR OVERPAYMENTS CAUSED BY EXCESS LEAVE
OCT 86 92 66 71.77. $28,596.93 $19,838.03 69.4%
NOV 86 82 59 72.0"/. $29,633.55 $22,374.73 75.5%
DEC 86 85 54 63.5% $36,138.25 $27,412.21 75.9%
JAN 87 76 64 84.2% $38,071.39 $34,034.14 89.4%
FEB 87 76 61 80.3% $30,898.92 $23,458.41 75.9%
MAR 87 55 46 83.6% $18,077.40 $15,076.47 83.4%
APR 87 90 75 83.3% $42,029.73 $33,907.59 80.7%
MAY 87 70 53 75.7% $30,178.55 $26,108.74 86.5%
JUN 87 69 60 87.0% $29,376.42 $24,068.59 81.9%
JUL 87 70 61 87.1% $29,876.90 $28,143.64 94.2%
FOR OVERPAYMENTS CAUSED BY RECOUPMENTS
DCT 86 65 54 83.1% $160,543.83 $135,731.04 84.5%
NOV 86 51 45 88.2% $155,347.38 $139,600.49 89.9%
DEC 86 76 69 90.8% $231,871.29 $201,037.92 86=7%
JAN 87 56 49 87.5% $152,379.96 $138,445.08 90.9%
rEB 87 61 56 91.8% $147,396.11 $137,020.74 93.0%
1AR 87 46 43 93.5% $122,242.57 $115,826.59 94.8%
}PR 87 82 72 87.8% $257,399.97 $219,762.54 85.4%
*tAY 87 62 56 90.3% $156,994.10 $140,306.24 89.4%
JUN 87 63 62 98.4% $154,656.94 $152,308.79 98.5%
JUL 87 69 69 100.0% $177,412.30 $177,412.30 100.0%
FOR OVERPAYMENTS CAUSED BY ADVANCE PAY
DCT 86 38 27 71.1% $25,280.01 $17,996.51 71.2%
40V 86 36 31 86.1% $23,470.64. $21,783.84 92.8%
)EC 86 36 33 91.7% $21,459.64 $18,528.90 86.3%
'AN 87 39 33 84.6% $32,303.20 $28,813.33 89.2%
'EB 87 36 29 80.6% $21,533.85 $15,406.94 71.5%
1AR 87 30 24 80.0% $18,112.01 $13,224.81 73.0%
>PR 87 59 44 74.6% $46,355.90 $33,255.14 71.7%
!AY 87 41 38 92.7% $31,921.79 $27,518.56 86.2%
!UN 87 29 26 89.7% $27,396.59 $24,087.21 87.9%
UL 87 27 23 85.2% $20,452.78 $18,284.74 89.4%
ENCLOSURE fc)
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DSSN FY 87 FY 87
6187 9999 TT IX $1 ,266,424. 59 29 . 47. £126.66
6092 5705 13. 27. $548,511. 18 12.87. £96. 15
5153 4131 9. 5X £116,754. 26 £28.26
6167 4221 9. 77. £422,458. 67 9.87. £100.08
679S 3632 8. 47. £71 ,138. 67 1 . 77. £19.59
5 1 90 3395 7. 87. £134,261. 7*3 3.17. £39.55
6796 2443 67. £380,603. 13 8 . 37. £155. 79
6816 1870 4. 37. £170,599. 76 4.07. £91.23
5136 1 720 4. 07. £278,357. 16 6.57. £161.84
6795 1265 *") 97. £171 ,206. 01 4 . 07. £135.34
6105 1148 2 67. £165,508. 96 3.87. £144. 17
6198 776 i
.
87. £102, 106. 31 2.47. £131.58
i>305 609 i. 47. £59, 105. OT 1 . 47. £97.05
609
1
621 i. 47. £69,194. 93 1 . 67. £ 1 1 1 . 43
6154 594 i 47. £88 , 030
.
51 2.07. £148. 20
6168 506 i 27. £98, 116. 91 *? TV £193.91
6107 313 > 0. 77 £17,309. 05 0.47. £55. 30
5159 168 0. 47. £11 ,686. 72 . 37. £69.56
5199 104 0. ">•/ £17,582. 68 0.47. £169.06
6109 91 0. 27. £4,406. 91 0.17. £48 . 43
6160 21 0. 07. £92,646. 53 t» o y £4,411. 74
C7CCT 19 0. 07. £4 , 366 44 0. 17. £229.81
609o 8 0. 0'/. £11 ,239. 29 0.37. £1 ,404.91
OTAL 43359 100. 07 £4,301 ,615. r>*2 100.07.
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3556 70.37. $3,031,616.05 70.57.
DSSN SUMMARY OF EARLY OUTS
YTD YTD YTD YTD
DSSN COUNT TOTAL 7. AMOUNT TOTAL 7.
5136 165 5 . 07. $243, 131.68 $3,241,592.83 7 . 57.
5190 206 7700 6 . 27. $97,921.22 $3,241,592.83 3.07.
6092 557 16.87. $412,694.26 $3,241 ,592.83 12.77.
6167 240 7 . 27. $293,756. 10 $3,241 ,592.83 9.17.
6187 969 <70 oy $955,293.41 $3,241 ,592.83 29.57.
6796 212 6.47. $290,945.26 $3,241 ,592.83 9.07.
2349 70.77. $2,293,741.93 70.87.
DSSN SUMMARY OF RECEIVED AS OVERPAID
YTD YTD YTD YTD
DSSN COUNT TOTAL 7. AMOUNT TOTAL 7.
5136 131 2501 $208 , 609 . 1
5
$2,834,710.58 7. 47.
5190 86 2501 3.47. $51 ,971.22 $2,834,710.58 1. 87.
6092 430 2501 17.27. $345, 115.58 $2,834,710.58 12. 27.
6167 339 2501 13.67. $307,650.20 $2,834,710.58 10. 97.
6187 701 2501 28 . 07. $727,435.63 $2,834,710.53 25. 77.
6796 165 2501 6 . 67. $262,246.42 $2,834,710.58 9. 37.
1852 74.17. $ 1 , 903 , 028 . 20 67. 17.
ENCLOSURE ft
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FOR ALL RECORDS PROCESSED
OCT S6 837 394 47. 17. $432,446
NOV-' 86 738 364 49.37. $435,849
DEC 86 749 376 50 . 27. $50 1 , 084
JAN 87 654 337 51.57. $429, 127
FEB 87 722 363 50.37. $422,286
MAR 87 460 199 43.37. $343 , 525
APR 87 627 334 $614,618
MAY 87 427 240 56 . 27. $394,016
JUN 87 359 183 51.07. $329,527
JUL 87 388 208 53. 67. $399,132
16 $280,008.19 64.77.









FOR OVERPAYMENTS CAUSED BY PAYMENTS
OCT 86 272 115 42.37. $105,968.78 $40,920.49 38.67.
NOV 86 112 43.97. $113,645.93 $45,080.44 J7 . //.
DEC 86 104 46 . 07. $107,049.81 $42,660.98 39 . 97.
JAN 87 93 4j On $106,506.65 $34,520.53 32.47.
FEB 87 ?4^ 91 37.67. $121,352.40 $31 ,188.57 25 . 77.
MAR 87 218 96 44.07. $101,752.66 $38,590.21 37.97.
APR 87 264 "134 50 . 87. $149,928.88 $57,568.44 38.47.
MAY 87 173 89 50 . 07. $97, 122.89 $51 ,998.26 53.57.
JUN 87 127 48 37 . 87. $55,290.89 $23,791.80 43.07.
JUL 87 142 » 58 40.87. $77,510.09 $31 ,303.03 40.47.











29 29 . 97. $26,696.66 $7,568.31 28 . 37.
n^ 25.67. $24,929.22 $6,737.42 27.07.
*7>o 28 . 27. $23,284. 19 $6,755. 11 29 . 07.
18 27 . Z7. $20,365.57 $5,581.94 27 . 47.
27 40.97. $18,258.69 $3,939.42 2 1 . 67.
19 4 1 . 37. $13,251. 10 $5,842.26 44. 17.
27 42.97. $19,213.41 $5,946.35 30 . 97.
19 45.27. $13,773.49 $5,094.02 37.07.
14 41.27. $14,292.94 $3,625.91 25 . 47.
14 $17,067.99 $8,329.88 48.87.











70 76. 17. $28,596.93 $23,110.23 80.87.
58 70.77. $29,633.55 $22,310.00 75.37.
56 65.97. $36,138.25 $25,278.92 70 . 07.
54 71. 17. $38,071.39 $27,553.49 72.47.
59 77.67. $30,893.92 $25,769.60 83.47.
34 61.87. $18,077.40 $12,513.44 69.27.
63 70.07. $42,029.73 $37,387. 68 89 . 07.
50 7 1 . 47. $30, 178.55 $23,718.92 78.67.
47 68. 17. $29,376.42 $20,593.60 70. 17.






i_>.\ jviiai h i i'ili'4 i 5 LhuatJ cl r\C'wUOl-'i*lfc.N I ta
65 56 86.27. $160,543.83 $142,010.04 88.57.
51 43 84.37. $155,347.38 $132,228.84 85. 17.
76 67 88 . 27. $231,871.29 $216, 159.70 93 . 27.
56 46 82. 17. $152,379.96 $136,638.07 89.77.
61 - 49 80.37. $147,396. 11 $109,540.39 74.37.
46 38 82.67. $122,242.57 $104, 161.09 85.27.
82 69 84. 17. $257,399.97 $226,747.41 88. 17.
62 52 83.97. $156,994. 10 $120,773.97 76.97.
63 49 77.87. $154,656.94 $123,054.54 79.67.
69 58 84 . 1 7. $177,412.30 $142,362.41 80.27.
FOR OVERPAYMENTS CAUSED BY ADVANCE PAY
38 3r^ 86.87. $25,280.01 $22,898.28 90.67.
36 31 86. 17. $23,470.64 $21 ,646.54 9^. ^7.
28 27 96.47. $21,459.64 $20,847.64 97. 17.
39 33 84.67. $32,203.20 $28,712.96 89 o 27.
36 33 91.77. $21 ,533.85 $20,261.21 94 . 1 %
30 22 73.37. $18,112.01 $13,617.70 75.27.
59 51 86 . 47. $46,355.90 $41 ,203.87 88 . 97.
41 40 97.67. $31,921.79 $30,941.25 96 . 97.
29 27 93. 17. $27,396.59 $25,611.26 93 . 57.
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End: (1) Suniitary statistics for Marine
(2) Cumulative overpayment statist
by DSSN and month
(3) Cumulative underpayment statis
by DSSN and month
(4) Distribution of unadjusted out
balance accounts
1. The enclosures reflect statistical
analyses of accounts in an out-of-balano
status for 9 months or longer of value
greater than or equal to $50 as of 31 Ju
1987. Statistics have been included for
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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS FINANCE CENTER





To: Commandant of the Marine Corps (FDF)
Sub j : RESULTS FROM LES . SAMPLE AUDIT (JUNE 1987)
REF: (A) ALMAR 158/86
Encl : (1) Statistical results with listing of system errors from
June's audit of sampled May LES's
(2) Automated Pay Systems comments
1. This report summarizes results from June's disbursing office
audit of May's sampled LES's (per the reference).
2. June's system error rate (.15%) is significantly less than
May's (.56%). We estimate from this month's sample system error
percentage a 95 percent probability that between .07 percent
and .23 percent of all accounts in June contain system deficiencies
3. Relationships among system, CO and DO type error rates in
June are as follows: (1) CO (3.25%) and DO (1.58%) type error
rates significantly exceed the system error percentage; (2) CO
type errors significantly exceed DO type errors; and (3) changes
in CO and DO type error rates between monthly audits are
insignificant.
4. Enclosure (1) lists types of system errors reported by
disbursing officers in June. Errors involving Leave Balance and
Travel Rations are the most frequently occurring types of system
deficiencies reported by disbursers in this month's sample audit.
Enclosure (2) provides comments concerning reported system errors
from our Directorate of Automated Pay Systems.
5. Refer questions or comments concerning this report to our
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V —v— » "*» "»*«"««uon is provided in response to the reference relative to thV 'disbursing audit of May 1987 LES's. iau he
a. Case #1: Problem identified by SAO 23-87. Listings of Marines afftot** a *aprovided to the disbursing officer each month for corrective action
;„
b
S 5^^ #2^ 6: Problems Previously identified. Due to the small DODulationtavolved and complex changes required to resolve the prol^w^ifl^ hasbeen deferred and will be completed in a future project involvingTe leave acco^tag



















UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
MARINE CORPS FINANCE CENTER





Subj: SYSTEM ASSURANCE OFFICER (SAO QUARTERLY STATUS REPORT) -
JUMPS/MMS DEFICIENCIES
Ref: (a) MCO 7220.44
End: (1) Quarterly Systems Deficiencies Report Jun 87
1. The reference provides policy and procedures for payment of Marines under
JUMPS/MMS and designates the Commanding Officer, Marine Corps Finance Center, as
the Systems Assurance Officer for the Marine Corps.





CG, MCAS, Cherry Point, NC (Disbo (5))
CG, MCRD, Parris Island, SC (Disbo (5))
CG, MCLB, Albany, GA (Disbo (5))
CG, MCB, Camp Lejeune, NC (Disbo (5))
CG, MCLB, Barstow, CA (Disbo (5))
CO, Camp S. D. Butler, FPO Seattle (Disbo (5))
CO, Henderson Hall, HQBN, Arlington, VA (Disbo (5))
CG, 2d FSSG (REIN), Camp Lejeune, NC (Disbo (5))
CO, MCAS, Iwakuni, Japan (Disbo (5))
CG, MCDEC, Quantico, VA (Disbo (5))
CO, MATSG-90, NATTC, NAS, Millington, TN (Disbo (5))
CO, HQ FMFPAC, Camp Smith, HI (Disbo (5))
CO, MCAS, Beaufort, SC (Disbo (5))
CG, 3d FSSG, FMFPAC, FPO San Francisco (Disbo (5))
CO, MCAS, Yuma, AZ (Disbo (5))
CG, MCB, Camp Pendleton, CA (Disbo (5))
CO, MCAS, New River, Jacksonville, NC (Disbo (5))
CO, MCAS, Kaneohe, HI (Disbo (5))
CG, MCAS, El Toro, Santa Ana, CA (Disbo (5))
CG, MCRD, San Diego, CA (Disbo (5))
CO, Camp Elmore, Norfolk, VA (Disbo (5))
CG, MCAGCC, Twentynine Palms, CA (Disbo (5))
OIC, Disb On-Site Exam Team (East) (15)
OIC, Disb On-Site Exam Team (West) (15)
CMC (FDD) HQMC, Washington, DC
CMC (MPI) HQMC, Washington, DC
REAL FAMMIS
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1. The following system deficiencies were carried forward from the March 1987 System
Deficiency Report. The status of each problem is listed.
a. Allotments . U&E COMPUTE ROUTINE (TTC U04) failed to reflect credit for
previously deducted amounts for tri-annual bond allotments when the retroactive stop
allotment transaction processed after date of discharge. Problem was noted
26 November 1986 and has been resolved.
b. Basic Allowance for Quarters (BAQ). JOIN ENTRY (TTC 020) erroneously
generated an overlapping credit of partial BAQ when Marines' dates of detachment and
join were identical. Problem was noted 23 October 1986 and is scheduled for correction
in Test Cycle 2-87.
c. Basic Pay
(1) GENERAL PROMOTION/REDUCTION ROUTINE (TTC G21) generated base
pay at an incorrect rate for transactions processed retroactively with an effective date
(ED) in 1986. Problem was noted 10 February 1987 and is scheduled for correction in a
future test cycle.
(2) GENERAL PROMOTION/REDUCTION ROUTINE (TTC G21) generated
deduction of base pay at an incorrect rate. Problem was noted 20 February 1987 and
remains unresolved. (Refer to SAO 12-87 and 24-87).
(3) U&E UPDATE ROUTINE (TTC U03) failed to update the prime base pay
remark with the new rate effective 870101. Problem was noted 5 March 1987 and
remains unresolved.
(4) GENERAL PROMOTION/REDUCTION ROUTINE (TTC G21) executed from
REDUCTION (TTC 056) failed to properly adjust the base pay remark. Problem was
noted 9 March 1987 and is scheduled for correction in a future test cycle.
(5) DROP FROM ACTIVE SERVICE (TTC 378) generated credits of base pay at an
incorrect amount for 31 December 1986 for member with less than 30 days service.
Problem was noted 10 March 1987 and remains unresolved.
d. Basic Educational Assistance Program (BEAP)
(1) The BEAP PARTICIPATION REPORT (TTC MC9) failed to display the number
of enlisted member's enrolled in BEAP for the current month. Problem was noted
6 January 1987 and is scheduled for correction in a future test cycle.
(2) The BEAP Participants Purged to History Report generated from U<5cE LOAD
PROCESS (TTC FGA) failed to accumulate total records purged and accumulated
deductions. Problem was noted 26 March 1987 and was corrected 5 May 1987.
e. Career Sea Pay (CARSEA)
(1) PROMOTION (TTC 052) failed to start career sea duty pay on the effective
date of promotion. Problem was noted 12 March 1987 and remains unresolved.
End (1)
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(2) CREDIT CARSEA DU FOR 30 DAYS OR LESS (TTC 147) generated credit of
career sea pay at an incorrect rate and failed to update the total sea service record.
Problem was noted 18 March 1987 and is scheduled for correction in Test Cycle 1-88.
(Refer to SAO 29-87).
f. Clothing Replacement Allowance (CRA)
. DROP FROM ACTIVE SERVICE (TTC
389) executed through GENERAL DROP (TTC G09) failed to post the drop date to the
CRA remark TO DATE. Problem was noted 12 January 1987 and was corrected
27 January 1987.
g. Delayed Checkage . SUSPEND LIQ OF INDEBTEDNESS (TTC 560) delete/add
entry generated an incorrect as of balance in the indebtedness remark (928) and the
credit remark (926). Problem was noted 12 December 1986 and is scheduled for
correction in a future test cycle.
h. Enlistment Bonus . CORRECTION ENTRY FOR ENLISTMENT BONUS (TTC 547)
failed to change the compute flag of an existing remark when a new remark was built
from the existing remark. Problem was noted 4 November 1985 and is scheduled for
correction in a future test cycle.
i. Expiration of Current Contract (ECC). ECC date forcasted incorrect amount for
member whose ECC expired prior to end-of-month payday. Member's ECC date was
24 February 1985. Problem was noted 4 March 1985 and has been resolved.
j. Foreign Duty Pay '(FORDU). CREDIT SEA or FOREIGN DUTY (TTC 125)
delete/add generated an erroneous amount in the 913 remark. Problem was noted
11 August 1986 and was corrected 14 January 1987.
k. Forfeiture of Pay/Court Martial .
(1) FORFEITURE OF PAY (TTC 283) erroneously generated deduction during a
period of non-pay status and commenced deduction for a second NJP prior to completion
of deduction of the first NJP. Problem was noted 19 July 1985 and is scheduled for
correction in a future test cycle.
(2) FORFEITURE OF PAY (TTC 283) deducted an incorrect amount for the second
forfeiture when a member was awarded concurrent NJP's. Problem was noted 3 January
1986 and remains unresolved.
1. Housing . CREDIT ADVANCE HOUSING SECURITY DEPOSIT (TTC 608) failed
with an incorrect format and edit error code. Problem was noted 10 February 1987 and
was corrected 20 April 1987.
m. Leave
(1) Problem was noted where excess leave was not accounted for when time lost
had been reported. Problem was noted 3 August 1984 and will be corrected in the leave
accounting redesign project. (Refer to SAO 37-84)
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(2) Processing of REENLISTMENT (TTC 004) or ENLISTMENT EXTENSION (TTC
117) is improperly reducing leave balance to zero instead of carrying leave balance
forward. Problem is sporadic and continues to be reviewed and tested for identification
and resolution when cases can be detected.
(3) U&E COMPUTE ROUTINE (TTC U04) executed from EXTENSION
ENLISTMENT EFFECTIVE (TTC 117) failed to carry positive leave balances forward to
the new contract for member's discharged for immediate reenlistment. Problem was
noted 20 November 1986 and has been resolved.
(4) CHECK TAD LEAVE (TTC 521) delete/add and delete as erroneous does not
post the day prior to the first day of excess leave to the TO DATE causing the
transaction to fail with a "Wn error. Problem was noted 11 February 1987 and is
scheduled for correction in a future test cycle.
(5) SPECIAL PMT FOR LST (TTC 642) failed to adjust the prime leave remark for
member who settled all leave prior to discharge for immediate reenlistment. Problem
was noted 11 March 1987 and has been resolved.
n. Liquidation of Indebtedness.
(1) PAY STATUS TABLE (TTC U130) erroneously computed on and adjusted an
inactive liquidation of indebtedness remark when a leave period was processed
retroactively. Problem was noted 15 January 1987 and has been resolved.
(2) U&E COMPUTE ROUTING (TTC U04) executed from CHECK UQ OF
INDEBTEDNESS (TTC 559) erroneously adjusted a 928 remark that was stopped without
payment. Problem was noted 30 March 1987 and was corrected 13 May 1987.
o. Lump Sum Leave (LSL)
(1) SPECIAL PMT FOR LSL (TTC 642) processed and failed to build a career LSL
remark (947) for members in a separated status. Problem was noted 23 August 1984 and
will be corrected in the leave accounting redesign project.
(2) SPECIAL PMT FOR LSL (TTC 642) with an effective date (ED) of 1 May 1984
processed prior to the end-of-month April 1984 U&E executed 5 May 1984. U<5cE
May 1984 should not have considered a TTC with ED of 1 May 1984. Problem was noted
17 September 1984 and will be corrected in the leave accounting redesign project.
p. Payments and Payrolls. TTC U150 (U<5cE LEAVE MODULE) is erroneously
overlaying instead of updating the saved leave remarks (952) causing TTC 642 (SPECIAL
PMT FOR LSL) to fail with an rtL" error. Problem was noted 15 December 1986 and
remains unresolved.
q. Period of Service (POS) . FILE BUILD (TTC G23) executed from CAMS ACCEPT
APPOINTMENT (TTC 054) failed to properly compute period of service. Problem was
noted 17 March 1987 and remains unresolved.
r. Permanent Change of Station (PCS) . PCS LAPSED TIME (TTC 520) erroneously
failed a delete/add transaction for member who completed four months of active during
the period of PCS. Problem was noted 26 February 1987 and was corrected 22 March
1987.
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s. State Income Tax Withholding (SITW). U&E TAX MODULE (TTC UAC) generated
erroneous SITW and state YTD wages on the January LES's for members discharged in
December 1986. Problem was noted 11 February 1987 and remains unresolved.
t. Temporary Lodging Allowance (TLA) . CHECK TLA (TTC 584) delete/add fails to
properly compute first and last days of TLA credit when the total amount is not divisible
by the number of days deleted. Problem was noted 19 February 1987 and remains
unresolved.
u. Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)
(1) U&E UPDATE ROUTINE (TTC U03) fails to correctly terminate intrim VHA
rate when the suspense date and processing date are the same. Problem was noted
18 March 1987 and was corrected 5 April 1987.
(2) CHAN BAQ (TTC 187) incorrectly computed VHA when a BAQ change was
reported retroactively. Problem was noted 27 March 1987 and was corrected 6 April
1987.
v. Update and Extract (U&E) . MGMT RPTS ACTIVITY TABLE (TTC ACT) posted
incorrect activity numbers to management reports. Problem was noted 20 March 1987
and was corrected 5 May 1987.
2. The following deficiencies have been identified since 31 March 1987. The status of
each problem is listed. ^
'
(a) Basic Allowance for Subsistence
(1) DOPMA TDY RATIONS (TTC 146) erroneously generated future dated
subsistance remarks (916). Problem was noted 13 April 1987 and is unresolved.
(2) PCS LAPSED TIME (TTC 520) generated an incorrect deduction of rations for
member whose dates of detachment and join were the same. Problem was noted 25 June
and is unresolved.
(3) Processing of TTC J765 (E0-E2 Utility) erroneously deducted DOPMA rations
for member when a reduction from E3 to E2 was processed retroactively. Problem was
noted 28 May 1987 and is unresolved.
(b) Basic Pay
(1) GENERAL PROMOTION REDUCTION ROUTINE (TTC G21) failed to consider
period of service date when member's promotion was reported retroactively and
generated base pay at an incorrect rate. Problem was noted 22 April 1987 and was
corrected 1 June 1987.
(2) U&E LES VAS EXTRACT ROUTINE (TTC U05) displayed an incorrect LES
message for members who were confined beyond their ECC. Pay and Allowances
continued to accrue while member was confined. Problem was noted 1 June 1987 and is
unresolved.
(3) GENERAL DROP (TTC G09) erroneously computed base pay for separated
members when the period of service computation did not agree with the years of service
remark (703). Problem was noted 16 June 1987 and is unresolved.
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c. Basic Educational Assistance Program (BEAP) . A problem was Identified where a
delete BEAP transaction was reported but failed to process because the amount
exceeded $999.99. Problem was noted 2 april 1987 and was corrected 5 April 1987.
d. Career Sea Duty Pay (CARSEA)
(1) CRED CARSEA 30 DAYS OR LESS (TTC 147) erroneously failed with an nLn
error and generated an invalid "Ln advisory message. Problem was noted 8 April 1987
and was corrected 17 April 1987.
(2) CRED CARSEA 30 DAYS OR LESS (TTC 147) generated invalid CARSEA PAY
and HISTORY remarks when the effective date (ED) of assignment was later than the ED
of termination that was reported. Problem was noted 2 June 1987 and is unresolved.
e. Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) . GENERAL PROMOTION/REDUCTION
ROUTINE (TTC G21) properly changed the COLA index to zero but failed to generate a
remark with zero amounts as the test cycle project was designed to do. Problem was
noted 22 May 1987 and is unresolved.
f. Delayed Checkage .
(1) CHECK OF PAY AND ALLOW ADJUST (MCFC INPUT) (TTC 693) erroneously
failed as a duplicate payment. Problem was noted 30 April 1987 and was corrected
1 May 1987. (Refer to SAO 36-87)
(2) The LES message displayed reflected erroneous dates for deductions of the
delayed checkage. Problem was noted 11 May 1987 and was corrected 20 May 1987.
g. Disability Severance Pay . PAY CODE/TAX CODE TABLE FOR F&E (TTC G29)
failed reflect the proper tax code for disability severance pay. Problem was noted
22 June 1987 and is unresolved.
h. Dishonored Checks . Processing of DISHONORED CK DED (TTC 695) established
an incorrect 941 remark. Problem was noted 24 April 1987 and was corrected 30 April
1987.
i. Enlistment Bonus . CHECKAGE OF COMBAT ARMS ENL BONUS (TTC 546) failed
to post the effective date to the date of recoupment in the remark (902) and TTC U04
(U&E COMPUTE ROUTINE) failed to change the recoupment compute flag. Problem
was noted 10 June 1987 and is unresolved.
j. Extension Bonus . START OVERSEAS EXT BONUS (TTC 577) erroneously failed
the on-line input transactions with a "Zn error, but the transaction appeared on the
System Exception Report. Problem was noted 9 April 1987 and was corrected 6 May
1987.
k. Leave . Half Day Excess Leave Action Report for 5 May 1987 erroneously
reflected reversal of the present RUC and DSSN in the report headers. Problem was
noted 7 May 1987 and was corrected 20 May 1987.
1. Payments and Payrolls
(1) SPECIAL PMT FOR ADV PAY (TTC 634) erroneously generated a credit
remark (926) and repayment remark (928) reflecting the pay code for advance Overseas
Housing Allowance. Problem was noted 12 May 1987 and was corrected 15 May 1987.
(Refer to SAO 38-87).
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(2) SPECIAL PAYMENT FOR ADV OHA, BAQ (TTC 640) Erroneously posts theadvance payment date to the suspense date of the repayment remark"^yment^f
nw£tSr Cann0t * SUSP€nded * Pr0Wem WaS n°^12 Ma* 198' and^corrected
(3) CREDIT/CASH DEPOSIT (TTC 504) for monies returned from financialInstitutions generated credit remarks (926) with an incorrect paydate Prob^m wM





EDrr/CASH DEPOSIT (TTC 504) generated an incorrect FROM DATE of
"?• Paiiod of Se™ce fPQS^- GENERAL PROMOTION/REDUCTION ROUTINEPTTC G21) generated erroneous base pay remarks for member who was previously






of RESTORE GRADE (TTC 320). Problem waVnoted 26 June1987 and is unresolved.











edP the 701 pay "* of zeroes and erroneously generated a creditremark (926) with the pay code of an enlisted reservist. Problem was noted 22 May 1987
nn^w
1^ 66"1 !8'*" 1 ?11 B°nUS fSRB) - U*E C0MpUTE AND FORECAST MODULETTC U04) failed to acknowledge and forecast SRB installments reported by TTC 586(Credit of SRB). Problem was noted 30 June 1987 and is unresolved.
P- Servicemens' Group Life Insurance (SGLI) . U&E COMPUTE ROUTINE (TTC U04)
erroneously generated deduction of SGU as a daily rate for a period of lost time which
was reported retroactively. Problem was noted 13 May 1987 and is unresolved.
<J. State Income Tax Withholding (SITW)
(1) U&E TAX Module (TTC UAC) failed to consider state wages and state tax
withheld in the W-2 process for the month of discharge. Problem was noted 5 May 1987
and is unresolved.
(2) U&E TAX Module (TTC UAC) computed SITW incorrectly for the month of
discharge for members who have an alternate tax plan. Problem was noted 12 May 1987
and is unresolved.
r. Veterans Educational Assistance Program (VEAP)
. The VEAP magnetic tape
produced out of mid-month update and extract (U<JcE) to report deductions to the
Veteran's Administration is erroneously reflecting dollars and cents. All amounts




Variable Housing Allowance (VHA)
. GENERAL PROMOTION REDUCTION
ROUTINE (TTC G21) failed to post a TO DATE to both open VHA remarks (901) for
member's stationed in Hawaii that had two open remarks on effective date of promotion
or reduction. Problem was noted 12 June 1987 and is unresolved.
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